Pagan-San Miguel v. United States, 736 F.3d 44

Petitioner Carlos Págan‑San‑Miguel, pro se, sought leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
He relied on recent Supreme Court decisions: Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, and on Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler.
Section 2255(h)(2) permits successive collateral relief only when based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review.”
The government and the court evaluated whether Frye, Cooper, Martinez, or Trevino announced such a new, retroactive constitutional rule.
Circuits had already concluded Frye and Cooper applied established Strickland/Hill principles rather than announcing new rules; circuits similarly treated Martinez as an equitable, not constitutional, rule.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Frye or Cooper announced a "new rule of constitutional law" making petitioner eligible to file a successive §2255	Frye and Cooper created new constitutional rules regarding ineffective assistance in plea bargaining that should apply retroactively	Frye and Cooper applied existing Strickland/Hill standards to plea‑bargaining facts and did not announce new constitutional rules	Denied — Frye and Cooper did not announce a new rule of constitutional law
Whether Martinez (and Trevino) established a new constitutional rule excusing procedural default and thus permits a successive §2255	Martinez (and Trevino) create a constitutional rule allowing ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims despite state procedural default	Martinez was characterized as an equitable, narrow exception to Coleman, not a new constitutional rule; Trevino applies Martinez’s exception under certain state procedures	Denied — Martinez/Trevino do not announce a new constitutional rule for §2255(h)(2) purposes

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (Supreme Court decision applying ineffective‑assistance principles to plea‑bargain negotiations)
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (Supreme Court decision applying Strickland/Hill standards to plea offer rejection)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (Supreme Court equitable ruling creating a narrow exception to Coleman for ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims)
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (Supreme Court applying Martinez exception where state procedures impede raising ineffective‑assistance claims on direct review)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (established two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applied Strickland to plea‑bargaining context)
Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) (held Frye/Cooper applied established Strickland/Hill law)
In re Liddell, 722 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (concluded Frye/Cooper did not announce new rules)
Hare v. United States, 688 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2012) (found Frye/Cooper applied established law)
Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2012) (treated Martinez as non‑constitutional for retroactivity)
Lykus v. Corsini, 565 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (procedural note on non‑appealability of denial of authorization to file successive petitions)