Packingham v. North Carolina
137 S. Ct. 1730
SCOTUS2017Background
- North Carolina statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. §14‑202.5) criminalized a registered sex offender’s access to "commercial social networking" websites that permit minors to be members or create personal pages; statute defined such sites by four broad features (advertising/revenue, social introductions/information exchange, user profiles, and user-to-user communication).
- Packingham, a registered sex offender from a prior conviction for sexual relations with a minor, posted a celebratory message on his personal Facebook page after a traffic ticket was dismissed; police used the post to identify and charge him under §14‑202.5.
- At trial Packingham moved to dismiss on First Amendment grounds; he was convicted and given a suspended sentence; the NC Court of Appeals struck down the statute; the NC Supreme Court reversed and upheld it.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the statute violated the First Amendment (applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment).
- The Supreme Court assumed for analysis that the statute covers common social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn) and that States may enact narrowly tailored prohibitions on specific conduct (e.g., contacting minors), but held the statute unconstitutional because it broadly barred access to social-media forums integral to modern public discourse.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Packingham) | Defendant's Argument (North Carolina) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §14‑202.5 violates the First Amendment by prohibiting access to commercial social‑networking sites | Statute unlawfully burdens protected speech by categorically barring access to core public forums (social media) not narrowly tailored to protect children | Law is a content‑neutral place restriction aimed at protecting children from recidivist sex offenders and is therefore permissible | Held unconstitutional: statute is not narrowly tailored and burdens substantially more speech than necessary |
| Proper standard of review: content‑based vs. content‑neutral regulation | Packingham argued the law is exceptional and restricts speech broadly in novel medium (supporting heightened scrutiny) | State argued it is a content‑neutral time/place/manner restriction subject to intermediate scrutiny | Court assumed, without deciding, intermediate scrutiny applies but found statute fails that test |
| Whether States may enact statutes targeting online conduct that facilitates abuse (e.g., contacting/grooming minors) | Packingham: States must use specific, narrowly tailored criminal prohibitions targeting illicit conduct rather than categorical bans on access | State: broad prophylactic bans necessary to prevent online contact that leads to abuse | Court: States may enact narrowly‑tailored laws prohibiting specific illicit online conduct, but §14‑202.5 is overly broad and invalid |
| Whether restricting convicted persons’ access to internet sites is permissible given state interest in protecting children | Packingham: Even convicted persons retain First Amendment rights; the law prevents lawful, reformative, and civic speech | State: protecting children from sexual exploitation is a compelling, legitimate interest justifying restrictions | Court: interest is significant but does not justify this sweeping restriction on lawful speech |
Key Cases Cited
- Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Internet is a "vast democratic forum" deserving First Amendment protection)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (content‑neutral restrictions must be narrowly tailored and not burden substantially more speech than necessary)
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (government may protect children but cannot suppress lawful speech as a means to suppress unlawful speech)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (protecting children from sexual exploitation is a compelling governmental interest)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upheld limited speech buffer zone near polling places; larger zones could become impermissible burdens)
- Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (invalidated blanket prohibition of First Amendment activities in an airport)
- Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (illegal conduct remains punishable even if facilitated by speech; narrower laws can target such conduct)