PACIFIC SOLAR ENERGY, SA DE CV v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 1:18-cv-00048

Background

Pacific Solar Energy wired a $105,028.05 insurance premium from its Banco Santander account in Miami to a Honduran insurer on Oct. 7, 2015; the recipient bank (Banco Continental) was added to OFAC’s Kingpin Act blocked list the same day and the transfer was blocked at U.S. Century Bank in Doral, Florida.
Plaintiff applied to OFAC for a license to release the blocked funds (Nov. 23, 2015), was denied (Mar. 28, 2016), requested reconsideration (June 2, 2016), and was denied again (Nov. 14, 2016).
OFAC’s Licensing decisions on Plaintiff’s application were made by staff in Washington, D.C.; OFAC has a small Miami office of three employees that did not handle this license application.
Plaintiff sued Treasury, OFAC, the OFAC Acting Director, and the Secretary of the Treasury in the Southern District of Florida seeking review of OFAC’s denials; defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue or transfer.
The district court analyzed venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A) (defendants’ residence) and § 1391(e)(1)(B) (where substantial part of events occurred), found venue improper in S.D. Fla., and transferred the case to the D.C. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether venue is proper under § 1391(e)(1)(A) (defendants’ residence)	OFAC maintains an office in Miami that handles licensing; therefore OFAC resides in S.D. Fla.	Defendants perform their official duties in Washington, D.C.; the Miami office is small and did not handle this matter, so defendants reside in D.C.	Venue not proper under § 1391(e)(1)(A); OFAC’s Miami office did not make OFAC a resident for this case.
Whether venue is proper under § 1391(e)(1)(B) (substantial part of events)	Key events (funds sent from Miami, blocked in Doral, Plaintiff’s employees and counsel in Miami) occurred in S.D. Fla., so venue is proper here.	Relevant wrongful acts (license denials and policies) were performed in D.C.; plaintiff’s local activities are not the defendant’s wrongful acts.	Venue not proper under § 1391(e)(1)(B); the actions giving rise to the claim occurred in D.C.
Whether the case should be dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a)	Plaintiff favored keeping the case in S.D. Fla. for convenience and deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum.	Defendants argued dismissal or transfer to D.C. because venue was improper here.	Court exercised discretion to transfer to District of Columbia in the interest of justice rather than dismiss.
Whether D.C. caseload/legislative intent requires a broad reading of residence under § 1391(e)	Plaintiff urged legislative intent to alleviate D.C. burdens supports venue outside D.C.	Defendants and court urged statutory text and precedent limit residence to where official duties are performed.	Court rejected expansive residence argument; legislative intent did not alter statutory reading.

Key Cases Cited

Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843 (11th Cir.) (plaintiff bears burden to make prima facie showing of venue on a motion to dismiss for improper venue)
Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.) (court may consider evidence outside complaint and make factual findings on venue)
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.) (agency not deemed resident merely because of a regional office)
Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir.) (only events with a close nexus to the claim determine where a substantial part of events occurred)
A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ala.) (focus on defendant’s relevant actions to determine venue under § 1391(e))
Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 (U.S.) (district court may dismiss or transfer cases filed in improper venue)
Word Fuel Corp. v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir.) (cited by plaintiff regarding substantive legal standard but irrelevant to venue analysis)