Pacific Pictures Corp. v. United States District Court, 679 F.3d 1121

Siegel and Shuster created Superman and assigned rights to DC Comics in 1937.
Toberoff formed a venture with the Heirs and acted as business advisor and attorney for that venture.
An associate stole Siegel/Shuster documents and sent them to DC Comics with a cover letter outlining a plan to capture Superman.
DC Comics retained the documents and sought discovery; Toberoff resisted asserting privilege over communications.
In 2007 a magistrate ordered disclosure of some documents, including the cover letter; Toberoff reported the incident to the FBI and later produced some documents.
In 2010 DC Comics filed suit against Toberoff and related entities alleging interference; the cover letter was incorporated into the complaint.
Toberoff sought a government subpoena for the documents; the U.S. Attorney indicated disclosure would be limited and consent-based.
DC Comics moved to deem the privilege waived due to voluntary disclosure to the government; the magistrate ruled in favor, and the district court denied review.
The Ninth Circuit reviews mandamus standards and the merits of selective waiver and other waiver theories.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether selective waiver to the government defeats the attorney‑client privilege.	Toberoff's disclosure to the government should not waive universally.	Selective waiver should be recognized to permit government disclosures without broad waiver.	Selective waiver rejected; waiver applies to the world.
Whether confidentiality agreements can preserve privilege after disclosure.	A government confidentiality letter could permit post hoc selective waiver.	Confidentiality agreements do not justify selective waiver and would undermine public policy.	Confidentiality-based selective waiver rejected.
Whether Toberoff’s status as crime victim affects waiver or common‑interest doctrine.	Victim status creates a common interest with the government.	No special common-interest privilege applies; no pre-disclosure joint defense.	No separate privilege or common-interest waiver established.
Whether involuntary production via subpoena automatically waives the privilege.	Subpoena-directed production may be involuntary and thus privileged.	Voluntary disclosure or failure to redact can constitute waiver.	Disclosures deemed voluntary; privilege waived.
Whether Petitioners’ failure to raise waiver issue earlier affects the analysis.	Issue could be raised later due to complexity.	Waiver issues can be raised despite timing; argument preserved.	Timely argument preserved; no manifest injustice in considering.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (U.S. 1981) (privilege to encourage full client-attorney communication)
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1980) (narrow interpretation of privilege to protect full disclosure)
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (selective waiver theory criticized by many circuits)
In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (selective waiver rejected by several circuits)
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (U.S. 1990) (limits on expanding privilege; cautious approach)
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991) (destructive impact of broad waivers on privilege)