Pablo Rubio v. Jefferson Sessions, III
891 F.3d 344
| 8th Cir. | 2018Background
- Pablo Rubio, a Salvadoran national who entered the U.S. without admission, sought Temporary Protected Status (TPS) after El Salvador received a TPS designation; USCIS later withdrew his TPS and DHS initiated removal proceedings.
- Rubio had three relevant prior adjudications: two Columbia, Missouri municipal ordinance violations (2002 leaving the scene; 2003 driving with excessive BAC) and a 2011 Missouri misdemeanor (driving with a suspended license).
- USCIS withdrew Rubio’s TPS for failure to respond to requests about two convictions; in removal proceedings he filed a TPS application that an IJ initially granted, but a different IJ granted the government’s reconsideration motion and denied TPS.
- The BIA affirmed the second IJ, holding Rubio’s two municipal ordinance adjudications were “convictions” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) and thus, because they were misdemeanors under 8 C.F.R. § 1244.1, rendered him ineligible for TPS under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i).
- Rubio challenged the BIA’s legal interpretation of “conviction” and procedural fairness; the Eighth Circuit reviewed the statutory issue de novo and denied Rubio’s petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri municipal ordinance adjudications are “convictions” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) for TPS eligibility | Rubio: Missouri treats municipal ordinance violations as civil/quasi‑criminal, lacking criminal protections, so they are not INA "convictions" | Government/BIA: Substance controls; if guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt and punishment meets federal misdemeanor definition, they are convictions | Held: Municipal adjudications here qualified as convictions because guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and punishments met the TPS misdemeanor definition |
| Whether state procedural differences (no plea colloquy, limited jury/appeal rights, relaxed evidentiary rules) prevent INA conviction classification | Rubio: Procedural deficiencies show municipal proceedings are noncriminal and lack required safeguards | Government: Procedural variations do not alter the federal substance inquiry into whether a judgment of guilt occurred | Held: Procedural differences irrelevant to substance inquiry; no departure from uniform federal standard |
| Whether the BIA’s inconsistent decisions (e.g., Bajric) preclude deference | Rubio: BIA precedent is inconsistent and thus not entitled to deference | Government: BIA’s reasoning here reconciles precedent and is entitled to deference | Held: Court defers to the BIA’s thorough substantive review; affirms agency deference |
| Whether Rubio suffered due process prejudice from limited time to respond to reconsideration and summary denial | Rubio: IJ denied adequate time and reasons, violating due process | Government: No prejudice shown; dispositive legal question was fully briefed and reviewed by BIA | Held: No due process prejudice shown; petition fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir.) (federal review of threshold eligibility questions for TPS)
- Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 629 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.) (interpretive context for § 1101(a)(48) amendment)
- Dominguez-Herrera v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 411 (8th Cir.) (upholding BIA finding that municipal convictions can be INA convictions)
- Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (federal law—not state labels—controls immigration consequences)
- Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (federal interpretation governs when statutes apply across contexts)
- Castillo v. Attorney General United States, 729 F.3d 296 (3d Cir.) (discussed regarding alleged BIA inconsistency)
- Batrez Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.) (supporting beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for finding guilt in immigration context)
- Franklin, United States v., 250 F.3d 653 (8th Cir.) (guidance on federal interpretation of state adjudications)
- Ismail v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 970 (8th Cir.) (due process prejudice standard in immigration proceedings)
