191 A.3d 817
Pa.2018Background
- On Nov. 1, 2014 Pennsylvania State Police investigators found four underage females inside Jet-Set Restaurant; three gained entry after showing ID that revealed they were minors; one had been inside earlier in 2014.
- Bureau cited Jet-Set for (1) permitting minors to "frequent" the premises (47 P.S. § 4-493(14)) and (2) furnishing alcohol to minors (47 P.S. § 4-493(1)); the furnishing count was sustained; the frequenting count was dismissed.
- Liquor Control Board and Berks County Ct. of Common Pleas upheld the dismissal, applying this Court's 1965 definition of "frequent" from Appeal of Speranza ("more than one or two visits").
- Commonwealth Court (divided) affirmed the dismissal; dissent argued 2003 amendments changed the statute’s scope so a single unauthorized presence of a minor (absent exceptions) suffices.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Speranza's definition still governs § 4-493(14) after the 2003 amendments.
- The Supreme Court (majority) held Speranza still controls: "frequent" means visiting often / more than one or two visits, and the Bureau must show a course of conduct by the licensee permitting minors to come on the premises.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bureau) | Defendant's Argument (Jet-Set) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Speranza's definition of "frequent" still applies to § 4-493(14) after 2003 amendments | 2003 amendments materially changed the statute: the new text lists exclusive circumstances when minors may be present, showing intent to prohibit even a single unauthorized visit | Amendments were organizational/technical; continued use of "frequent" indicates legislative approval of Speranza's definition (visit often; >1–2 visits) | Speranza controls; "frequent" means visit often / more than one or two visits; Bureau must prove a course of conduct permitting minors to come on premises |
| If ambiguous, whether statute should be strictly construed against prosecution (penal statute) | (Alternate) The statute should be read to favor restricting minors and allow enforcement on single occurrences | Jet-Set argued Speranza plus presumption of legislative intent foreclose new meaning | Court affirmed lower courts on Speranza ground; declined to revisit alternate strict-construction argument on review |
Key Cases Cited
- Appeal of Speranza, 206 A.2d 292 (Pa. 1965) (defined "frequent" in § 4-493(14) as visiting more than one or two times and requiring proof of a course of conduct by the licensee)
- Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 127 A.3d 745 (Pa. 2015) (presumption that legislature adopts prior judicial constructions when language is reenacted)
- A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016) (plenary review for statutory interpretation questions)
- Parisi v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 143 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1958) (presumption that repeated statutory language carries the same judicial construction)
- Bateman-Gallagher Post No. 668 v. Commonwealth, 540 A.2d 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (discussed by dissent; addressed frequenting charge facts but did not invoke Speranza)
- In re Buhl's Estate, 150 A. 86 (Pa. 1930) (cited for principle that repeated statutory language suggests legislative intent to adopt prior interpretation)