P. v. Perez CA4/3
214 Cal. App. 4th 49
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Perez, age 16 at the time, raped Mario (9) with a broken light saber and coerced Andy (8) to participate in the acts.
- Acts occurred in Mario and Andy's home; Perez used force, grabbing and coercing the victims and shouting to deter disclosure.
- Perez was convicted on four counts: sexual penetration of an eight-year-old with a foreign object by force; sexual penetration of a child under 14 with a more-than-seven-years-older offender; forcible lewd act on the eight-year-old; and forcible lewd act on the nine-year-old.
- Sentences were 8 years on count 1 and 15 years on count 2, with concurrent stays under Penal Code section 654, culminating in two consecutive 15-to-life terms (30-to-life total).
- The trial judge indicated he would have imposed concurrent terms if he had discretion; Perez is eligible for parole at age 47.
- Perez challenged sufficiency of force evidence, the applicability of Miller/Graham/Caballero to his sentence, the constitutionality of California’s one-strike law as applied to minors, and traditional disproportionality under Lynch/Dillon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there substantial evidence of force against Andy? | Perez | Perez | Yes; substantial evidence of force/duress beyond the lewd acts existed. |
| Do Miller, Graham, Caballero render the sentence unconstitutional for a minor here? | Perez | Perez | No; not a de facto LWOP; meaningful life expectancy remains; rules do not apply. |
| Is California's one-strike law unconstitutional as applied to minors? | Perez | Perez | No; trial court lacked discretion in charging and sentencing, but sentence passes constitutional muster. |
| Does the case meet Lynch/Dillon disproportionality standards? | Perez | Perez | No; punishment fits the crimes; not the rare disproportionality scenario. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (no mandatory LWOP for juveniles in homicide cases; life-term discretion remained a concern)
- Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2010) (no LWOP for non-homicide juveniles; meaningful life expectancy matters)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (Cal. 2012) (non-homicide juvenile sentence can be disproportionate as functional equivalent of LWOP)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (death penalty for juveniles is unconstitutional; relevance to youth culpability)
- In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410 (Cal. 1972) (traditional disproportionality standard for juvenile life terms)
- Dillon v. Gomez, 34 Cal.3d 441 (Cal. 1983) (premature for discretionary reduction in juvenile sentencing; pre-Miller context)
- In re Nunez, 173 Cal.App.4th 709 (Cal. App. 2009) (rare disproportionality reversal under Lynch/Dillon line)