P People of Michigan v. Melissa Sue Morgan
353557
| Mich. Ct. App. | Mar 10, 2022Background
- Criminal appeal arising from convictions in Kalamazoo Circuit Court; the concurrence/dissent (Justice Stephens) addresses only the expert‑testimony issue involving KDPS Officer Steven Seiser.
- Prosecution qualified Seiser as an expert on patterns of behavior of methamphetamine users based on his years with KVET and daily contact with drug users.
- Seiser testified about common patterns (e.g., women forming dependent relationships, use of manipulation), but admitted he had not studied the literature, had no reliable statistics, and was often "guessing." He also relied in part on statements from paid or cooperating confidential informants.
- Defense moved to disqualify Seiser; the trial court admitted his testimony for background purposes; the jury was instructed to treat it as background, not substantive proof against defendant.
- A social‑worker defense witness (Holly Rosen) gave somewhat similar trauma‑informed testimony about vulnerability, manipulation, and survival strategies among drug‑dependent/homeless persons.
- Justice Stephens agreed the trial court abused its gatekeeping role in admitting Seiser’s expert testimony under MRE 702 but concluded the error was not outcome determinative and would affirm the convictions and sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by qualifying Seiser as an expert on methamphetamine‑user behavior (MRE 702) | Seiser’s years of KVET experience and daily contact with drug users provided a reliable basis to assist the jury | Seiser lacked formal study, statistics, or reliable methodology; opinions were speculative and derived from untrustworthy informants | Justice Stephens: admission was an abuse of discretion (expert testimony unreliable) |
| Whether Seiser’s testimony was beyond common understanding (necessity under MRE 702) | Testimony provided specialized background the average juror lacked | Jurors could evaluate the relationship evidence without the officer’s generalized profile; testimony concerned matters within lay comprehension | Held: such general background was unnecessary; admission was improper |
| Whether Seiser’s testimony was cumulative and therefore harmless | Seiser’s experience added admissible background that did not single out defendant | Testimony was speculative and could prejudice credibility; defendant argued it affected trial strategy and credibility | Held: although erroneous to admit, the error was not outcome determinative (harmless) |
| Whether admission of Seiser’s testimony triggered a prejudicial "chain of events" (e.g., prompting Rosen’s testimony and expanded use of texts) | Admission did not compel defense strategy; Rosen’s testimony addressed trauma‑informed interviewing independent of Seiser | Admission forced defense to counter Seiser and led to adverse use of other evidence | Held: record does not support the chain‑of‑events theory; instruction and cumulative evidence mitigated harm |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Kowalski, 492 Mich 106 (2012) (trial court acts as gatekeeper under MRE 702; expert testimony must assist the trier of fact)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (reliability inquiry for expert testimony is flexible and fact‑specific)
- People v. Dobek, 274 Mich App 58 (2007) (exclude expert testimony based on assumptions not comporting with facts or derived from unreliable data)
- People v. Carll, 322 Mich App 690 (2018) (MRE 702 requires trial court to ensure reliability of expert testimony)
- People v. Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40 (2018) (expert opinion must be rationally derived from a sound foundation)
- People v. Lukity, 460 Mich 484 (1999) (standard for reversal on preserved non‑constitutional error: more probable than not that error was outcome determinative)
- People v. Bynum, 496 Mich 610 (2014) (expert testimony inadmissible if matter is within common understanding of jurors)
- People v. Mullins, 322 Mich App 151 (2017) (presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions)