183 A.D.3d 903
N.Y. App. Div.2020Background
- On Nov. 12, 2007, 18‑year‑old Khiel Coppin was fatally shot 14 times by NYPD officers after Coppin's mother called 911 about a domestic dispute. Plaintiff is the decedent's mother.
- Defendants: City of New York and officers Deputy Inspector McEvoy, Ss. Carrara and Prokesch, Detective Harvey, and Officers Livingston and Scalcione.
- Plaintiff sued for wrongful death, § 1983 violations (excessive force and deprivation of familial association), and failure to follow NYPD Patrol Guide for barricaded/emotionally disturbed persons; defendants moved for summary judgment.
- Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion in full. Plaintiff appealed.
- Appellate Division modified: affirmed dismissal of claims based on alleged Patrol Guide noncompliance (governmental immunity), reversed dismissal of claims alleging officers' negligent use of deadly force, denied summary judgment on most § 1983 excessive‑force claims, but affirmed dismissal of the claim challenging the number of shots fired; failure‑to‑intervene claim against McEvoy was dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether City is vicariously liable for officers' failure to follow Patrol Guide (barricaded/emotionally disturbed persons) | City is liable because officers violated Patrol Guide mandates | City entitled to governmental immunity because actions involved discretionary judgment and no clear Patrol Guide mandate | Affirmed for City: governmental immunity barred this theory of municipal liability |
| Whether City is vicariously liable for officers' negligent use of deadly physical force | City liable for negligent deadly force by officers | City invokes governmental immunity for officers' conduct | Reversed as to this theory: denial of summary judgment — alleged deadly‑force violations of Patrol Guide are non‑discretionary and raise triable issues |
| Whether officers are entitled to summary judgment on § 1983 excessive‑force claims (objective reasonableness and qualified immunity) | Force was excessive and not objectively reasonable | Use of force was objectively reasonable; officers entitled to qualified immunity | Reversed: triable issues exist about objective reasonableness and whether qualified immunity applies |
| Whether the number of shots fired supports an excessive‑force claim | Number of rounds fired was excessive | Officers justified in firing until perceived threat ended; entitled to qualified immunity on this element | Affirmed for defendants: no triable issue as to continuing fire until threat ended; number‑of‑shots claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Valdez v. City of New York, [citation="18 NY3d 69"] (discretionary‑act governmental immunity bars municipal liability for discretionary conduct)
- Graham v. Connor, [citation="490 U.S. 386"] (excessive‑force claims judged under Fourth Amendment objective‑reasonableness standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, [citation="555 U.S. 223"] (qualified immunity framework and burden shifting)
- Tennessee v. Garner, [citation="471 U.S. 1"] (deadly force permissible only when officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses significant threat)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, [citation="572 U.S. 765"] (officers may continue firing until the perceived threat ends)
- McCummings v. New York City Tr. Auth., [citation="81 NY2d 923"] (standard for negligent use of deadly force by police)
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., [citation="68 NY2d 320"] (summary judgment burden and opposing‑party requirements)
- Boyd v. City of New York, [citation="149 AD3d 683"] (application of qualified immunity and excessive‑force analysis at summary judgment)