Our Lady's Inn v. City of St. Louis
349 F. Supp. 3d 805
E.D. Mo.2018Background
- St. Louis Ordinance No. 70459 (2017) bars discrimination based on "reproductive health decisions" or pregnancy in employment and housing, with specified religious exemptions and an enforcement scheme referencing City Ordinance 67119.
- Plaintiffs: Our Lady's Inn (pro‑life nonprofit housing and employer), Archdiocesan Elementary Schools (Catholic schools requiring employees to adhere to Catholic teachings), and O'Brien Industrial Holdings and Frank O'Brien (closely held company and owner opposed to contraceptive/sterilization/abortion coverage).
- Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief alleging violations of the First Amendment (free speech and expressive association), freedom of religion (including Missouri RFRA), equal protection, due process/vagueness, and state statutory conflicts; they challenge both as‑applied and facial invalidity of employment and housing provisions.
- Central textual dispute: whether the Ordinance’s exemption for "religious institution, corporation, association, society, health care facility or educational institution with historic religious affiliation" means the adjective "religious" applies to the entire series (broad religious‑entity exemption) or only to the first noun.
- Court found "religious" modifies each noun in the series, held the Ordinance as applied: (1) cannot force O'Brien Plaintiffs to provide insurance covering abortion, contraception, or sterilization (violation of Missouri RFRA); and (2) violates expressive association rights of Our Lady's Inn and Archdiocesan Elementary Schools (as‑applied) and enjoined enforcement against them in specified respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Ordinance requires employers to provide insurance covering abortion/contraception/sterilization | O'Brien: text exempts only "religious institutions," so nonreligious employers like O'Brien would be forced to provide coverage contrary to religious beliefs and Missouri RFRA | City: exemption applies only to the first noun; Ordinance does not require employers to provide such coverage and was drafted consistent with Hobby Lobby | Court: "religious" modifies each noun in the series; applying that reading, Ordinance cannot be enforced against O'Brien Plaintiffs to require such coverage (Missouri RFRA violation) |
| Whether employment/housing provisions are content‑ or viewpoint‑based speech regulations | Our Lady's Inn & Archdiocese: provisions regulate speech and association by compelling inclusion of persons who oppose Plaintiffs' missions (content/viewpoint discrimination) | City: ordinance is content‑neutral, regulates discriminatory conduct to protect reproductive‑decision makers and contains religious exemptions | Court: ordinance regulates conduct (anti‑discrimination) and any speech burden is incidental; free speech claim (as‑applied) fails, but expressive association claim succeeds as applied to Our Lady's Inn and Archdiocese |
| Whether the Ordinance burdens expressive association rights by forcing employment or housing of those who dissent from Plaintiffs' pro‑life missions | Plaintiffs: forced inclusion would significantly affect ability to advocate and inculcate religious/mission values | City: protects nondiscrimination and access to employment/housing; compelling interests justify ordinance | Court: Plaintiffs are expressive associations; forced inclusion would significantly affect advocacy; City failed to show narrow tailoring/compelling evidence — employment provisions invalid as applied to Plaintiffs; housing provisions invalid as applied to Our Lady's Inn |
| Whether the Ordinance is facially overbroad or void for vagueness such that entire ordinance must be invalidated | Plaintiffs: facial challenge since many applications allegedly unconstitutional and enforcement provisions defective | City: ordinance has legitimate sweep, exemptions, and drafting intent; not facially invalid | Court: declined to reach facial overbreadth/vagueness because Plaintiffs prevailed on as‑applied claims; did not invalidate ordinance facially |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (recognizing RFRA‑style protection for closely held corporations refusing contraceptive coverage)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content‑based speech regulations trigger strict scrutiny)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (facial/as‑applied challenge distinction discussion)
- Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (analysis of relief scope and challenge framing)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (when conduct and speech are combined, regulation of nonspeech conduct may be permissible)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (distinguishing conduct regulation from viewpoint‑based speech regulation)
- Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (laws targeting conduct that uses speech are not necessarily First Amendment violations)
- Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (incidental burdens on speech from conduct regulation may be permissible)
- Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (conduct vs. expressive‑speech distinctions and religious liberty context)
- Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (expressive association test and forced inclusion analysis)
- Hosanna‑Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (ministerial exception principles cited though not decided here)
- Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parental rights and internal affairs of religious education referenced)