69 F. Supp. 3d 566
E.D. Va.2014Background
- Osei worked as a security guard at the GSA warehouse in Springfield, VA; Coastal took over the contract from American Security and continued the same work site, workforce, and supervision; she had been at the site since December 2009 and Coastal relied on the predecessor’s training certification; in April 2013 she was disciplined for flag handling and failing to report a fire alarm and was placed on administrative leave after an alleged violent response to the disciplinary notices; she had a history of leave requests (July 2012 for albuterol for her daughter, January 2013 for a hospitalized daughter, March 2013 to take her coughing/wheezing daughter to a medical center) with varied handling by Coastal; in May 2013 Coastal offered reassignment (mostly part-time, weekend positions) and there is dispute over whether full-time opportunities were also offered, but Osei has not worked since the suspension; the Amended Complaint asserted FMLA retaliation among other claims, but the Court dismissed all but the FMLA retaliation claim; the Court ultimately denies summary judgment on the FMLA issues, finding potential successor-in-interest status and disputed material adverse actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coastal is a successor in interest for FMLA eligibility. | Osei is eligible because Coastal continued the same contract and workforce; predecessor periods count toward 12 months. | Coastal argues no successor status or that eligibility is not established. | The court finds Coastal is a successor in interest, making Osei an eligible employee. |
| Whether Osei’s opposition to FMLA violations constitutes protected activity. | As an eligible employee, her opposition is protected. | Without eligibility, no protected activity. | Resolved in favor of Osei on eligibility; protected activity supported by successor status. |
| Whether a reasonable jury could find that Coastal’s reassignments/inaction were materially adverse actions. | The tapering reassignment efforts and pay-reducing opportunities were materially adverse. | Disputes over causation and whether actions were termination or reassignment. | Yes—there are factual disputes about whether there was a termination or materially adverse action. |
| Whether Osei should be allowed to raise successor-in-interest theory at summary judgment. | Discovery and pleadings support the theory; Coastal slept on defenses. | Amendment/preclusion due to discovery timing. | Allowed; court did not preclude discussion of successor theory. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2008) (eight-factor successor-in-interest analysis guides FMLA eligibility)
- Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2010) (eight-factor analysis supports successor determination)
- White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. 53 (Supreme Court 2006) (material adverse standard for retaliation)
- Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1999) (defines material adversity in retaliation context)