Oscar Pereacruz v. the State of Texas
05-18-01122-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 18, 2021Background
- Victim E.G. (9 at trial) reported abuse that began when she was about six while she stayed overnight at appellant Oscar Pereacruz’s apartment where his wife Maricela babysat her.
- E.G. described multiple incidents: appellant’s penis contacted and penetrated her anus (once through tights), appellant touched her vagina with his hand, and she observed items in the closet including a camera and possibly a gun.
- Police obtained a forensic interview; appellant denied the allegations in his custodial interview and at trial, testifying he worked overnight, took epilepsy medication, and would not have been awake for middle-of-night conduct.
- Appellant’s family witnesses testified the sleeping arrangements made the alleged conduct unlikely and that Maricela did not babysit; Mother and E.G. testified Maricela did babysit.
- A jury convicted Pereacruz of aggravated sexual assault of a child (50 years) and indecency with a child by sexual contact (10 years), sentences ordered consecutively.
- Appellant appealed raising insufficiency of evidence, improper transfer between district courts (due process/forum-shopping), and jury-unanimity errors in the charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Pereacruz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for both offenses | E.G.’s testimony (uncorroborated) is legally sufficient to prove penetration and sexual contact; jurors resolved credibility against defendant | E.G.’s testimony was inconsistent/unreliable; alibi (work schedule/medication) and family testimony preclude the alleged middle-of-night acts | Affirmed. Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to verdict, a rational juror could find elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt (Jackson standard) |
| Transfer between district courts (due process/forum-shopping) | Transfer was properly accomplished by written orders of the sending and receiving judges; defense had notice and opportunity to be heard | Transfer was arranged ex parte and violated local rules/procedural due process; constituted forum-shopping by prosecutor | Affirmed. Transfer complied with local rules and statutes; communications were procedural (not ex parte on merits); defense received notice/hearing and showed no resulting prejudice |
| Jury unanimity—aggravated sexual assault (contact vs. penetration) | Disjunctive submission was proper or harmless because contact and penetration of same orifice overlap | Disjunctive charge allowed conviction on separate offenses without juror unanimity | Affirmed. Although contact and penetration are distinct, where both concern the same orifice penetration necessarily includes contact (Jourdan), so no egregious harm resulted |
| Jury unanimity—indecency with a child (hand-to-genitals vs. genitals-to-child) | Jurors likely unanimously found all charged conduct; defense was all-or-nothing denial | Disjunctive submission allowed jurors to convict on different acts without unanimity | Affirmed. Error existed but not egregious harm—record and theory of defense make a non-unanimous verdict unlikely (Almanza standard) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (establishes standard for sufficiency review: evidence must permit a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (contact and penetration are distinct offenses for unanimity purposes)
- Jourdan v. State, 428 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (when contact and penetration concern the same orifice, a finding of penetration necessarily includes contact, reducing unanimity risk)
- Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (each form of sexual contact is a separate criminal act requiring unanimity)
- Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (jurors must agree on a single and discrete incident constituting the offense)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (standard for reversing unobjected-to jury charge error: defendant must show egregious harm)