Oscar Melendez v. Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secy, et, 928 F.3d 425

Melendez, a Salvadoran national, entered the U.S. in Feb 2000 on a one‑month visitor visa and overstayed.
El Salvador was designated for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in Mar 2001; Melendez applied for and was granted TPS (date not in record). From visa overstay until TPS grant he was unlawfully present.
He has an approved I-130 filed by a U.S. citizen brother and filed Form I-485 to adjust status in July 2016; USCIS denied the I-485 in Sept 2017, finding he failed to maintain continuous lawful status after entry.
Melendez sued DHS seeking a declaratory judgment that USCIS wrongly denied adjustment; district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
On appeal the government conceded §1252’s bar did not apply because the continuous‑presence determination is nondiscretionary; the Fifth Circuit vacated the jurisdictional ruling but dismissed the complaint on the merits for failure to state a claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of I-485 was reviewable	Melendez: denial was a nondiscretionary statutory determination and courts have jurisdiction	Government (initially): §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of §1255 relief; later conceded nondiscretionary point	Court: jurisdiction exists because continuous‑presence eligibility is nondiscretionary
Whether TPS eliminates prior unlawful presence disqualifying adjustment	Melendez: §1254a(f)(4) treats TPS beneficiaries as "in, and maintaining, lawful status" for §1255, so prior unlawful presence should not bar adjustment	Government: §1254a(f)(4) only applies during the TPS period and does not erase pre‑TPS unlawful presence	Court: Held §1254a(f)(4) is temporally limited to the TPS period and does not cure pre‑TPS unlawful presence; Melendez fails to state a claim
Whether TPS can be treated as a new date of "entry" for §1255 purposes	Melendez: grant of TPS effectively creates a new lawful starting point for continuous‑presence calculation	Government: no statutory basis; TPS does not function as a new entry date	Court: No statutory support; TPS does not retroactively negate prior unlawful conduct
Whether any exception or regulatory provision saves Melendez	Melendez: argued caveats/exceptions (e.g., not fault of alien) might apply implicitly	Government: identified statutory exceptions (immediate relatives, no‑fault) do not apply	Court: Exceptions do not apply; dismissal with prejudice affirmed

United States v. Orellana, 405 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2005) (TPS termination consequences and reversion to prior status)
Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing discretionary relief from nondiscretionary statutory determinations)
Serrano v. United States Attorney General, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) (TPS does not satisfy §1255’s inspection/admission or erase pre‑TPS defects)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard: plausibility requirement)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (limits on accepting legal conclusions in Rule 12(b)(6) review)