Osborne v. Yasmeh
B262043A
Cal. Ct. App.Jul 29, 2016Background
- Plaintiffs (Flowers — a paraplegic who uses a service dog — his wife Rebecca Osborne, and stepsons Seth and Kody Messmer) visited a hotel managed by defendants in July 2013; hotel staff refused a room unless a $300 nonrefundable cleaning fee (in addition to an ~$80 room charge) was paid because of the dog; plaintiffs left without paying or checking in.
- Plaintiffs filed two separate suits alleging violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 51) and intentional infliction of emotional distress; Osborne also invoked Civ. Code § 51.5 (protection for persons associated with disabled individuals).
- Defendants moved/demurred below relying on Surrey v. True Beginnings, arguing a plaintiff must tender the purchase price (i.e., pay the discriminatory fee) to have Unruh Act standing because plaintiffs did not pay or become guests.
- Trial courts sustained demurrers without leave to amend in both cases; judgments were entered and plaintiffs appealed; the appeals were consolidated.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it rejected Surrey’s bright-line rule as inapplicable where a disabled person personally experienced discriminatory denial of access (including refusal of accommodation because of a service dog) and held tender of payment is not required to establish Unruh Act standing; associated persons have standing if they personally experienced the discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs had standing under the Unruh Act after being refused a room without paying the alleged discriminatory fee | Plaintiffs argued they personally experienced discriminatory denial of access (and Osborne as associated with a disabled person under § 51.5), so payment was not required to have standing | Defendants relied on Surrey: a plaintiff must tender the purchase price/pay the discriminatory fee to have standing to sue under the Unruh Act | Court held Surrey’s bright-line rule is inapplicable here; tender of payment is not required when a disabled person personally experienced denial of access; associated persons have standing if they too personally experienced discrimination |
| Whether Surrey’s bright-line “tender payment” rule controls Unruh standing generally | Plaintiffs argued Surrey is distinguishable and inconsistent with Unruh’s history and case law protecting persons who were denied access | Defendants argued Surrey controls and forecloses standing because plaintiffs never paid or became guests | Court rejected extending Surrey’s rule here and declined to require payment as a condition of standing in cases of direct denial of access, especially ADA-related service-animal refusals |
| Whether Osborne’s first amended complaint was a sham pleading (contradicting earlier allegations) | Osborne explained new facts (a family member later attempted to offer payment and was told manager simply did not want a dog), and asserted the new allegations did not contradict earlier claims but supplemented them | Defendants contended the amended pleading contradicted prior admissions and discovery and thus was a sham | Court held the amended complaint was not a sham; adding or clarifying facts after initial pleading is permissible and should be tested in discovery, not by demurrer |
| Whether courts below properly sustained demurrers to plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims | Plaintiffs argued the facts supported an IIED claim | Defendants contended the IIED claim was derivative of failing Unruh claims and thus should be dismissed | Court declined to decide IIED sufficiency on appeal because trial courts did not rule on that issue in substance and reversed the demurrers instead |
Key Cases Cited
- Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160 (Cal. 2007) (Unruh standing: plaintiff-victim of discriminatory act has standing; no requirement to give defendant notice/opportunity to correct)
- Surrey v. True Beginnings, 168 Cal.App.4th 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (adopted a bright-line rule that one must tender the purchase price to have standing for discriminatory pricing — Court here declined to extend that rule)
- Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal.3d 24 (Cal. 1985) (Unruh Act forbids sex-based price discounts; the Act covers unequal treatment in services/pricing, not only exclusion)
- Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal.4th 661 (Cal. 2009) (discussion of Unruh and Disabled Persons Act interplay and incorporation of ADA violations into Unruh remedies)
- Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors, 221 Cal.App.3d 1377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (associations or advocates that did not personally suffer the discriminatory denial lacked standing under Unruh)
- In re Cox, 3 Cal.3d 205 (Cal. 1970) (historical and broad view of Unruh: arbitrary exclusions from business establishments are forbidden; standing not tied to having paid for goods/services)