Osborne v. Leroy Twp.
2017 Ohio 1506
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Osborne owns vacant land in Leroy Township containing an oil and gas well operated by Great Plains Exploration; a roadway to Vrooman Road requires frequent repairs.
- Osborne/Great Plains stored piles of concrete and asphalt debris on the property and erected a roadside sign reading “WE TAKE CONCCRETE & ASPHALT.”
- Township zoning inspector informed them the sign and on-site storage of debris violated the township zoning resolution, but allowed immediate application of debris to the roadway and suggested permits/variance options.
- Appellants filed for declaratory and injunctive relief and the township prosecuted a municipal criminal action; the parties settled the criminal case (sign removed) while the civil case proceeded.
- On first appeal this court affirmed the trial court on debris-storage preemption issues but reversed as to the sign because the wrong zoning section had been applied; case remanded for consideration under section 23 governing signs.
- On remand the trial court granted summary judgment for the township, holding section 23.05 permits only on-premises signs that advertise the business (company, brand, goods sold, or services rendered), so the concrete/asphalt sign was impermissible; appellants’ constitutional challenge was not preserved and did not constitute plain error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the township zoning resolution (§23.05) allows an on-premises sign that states the property will accept concrete/asphalt | Osborne: acceptance of debris is a service related to the oil/gas business and benefits the public, so it fits “goods sold or services rendered” | Leroy Twp.: §23.05 limits on-premises permanent signs to advertising the proprietor/company, brand, goods sold or services rendered; the sign does not advertise the oil/gas business | Court: §23.05 is unambiguous and requires advertisement of the business/company/brand or goods/services; the sign is not permitted under §23.05; summary judgment for township affirmed |
| Whether §23.05 should be construed broadly to include ancillary services not directly tied to the primary business | Osborne: court’s narrow reading improperly imports limits not in text | Leroy Twp.: plain text restricts permissible content to company/brand/goods/services | Court: plain meaning controls; no construction required; restriction applied as written |
| Whether the zoning regulation is preempted by state oil-and-gas law (R.C. Ch. 1509) as to sign regulation | Osborne: regulation of sign and debris is preempted by state law (earlier contention) | Leroy Twp.: zoning regulation does not conflict with state scheme; township may regulate storage and signs | Court: earlier appeal already upheld township authority over debris storage; here, sign regulation enforced under §23.05 |
| Whether §23.05 violates the First Amendment/Ohio Constitution | Osborne: the provision unconstitutionally restricts speech | Leroy Twp.: constitutional challenge was not raised below; courts should not address on appeal | Court: claim not raised in trial court; reviewed for plain error and rejected — no exceptional circumstances to consider the constitutional claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Saunders v. Clark Cty. Zoning Dept., 66 Ohio St.2d 259 (1981) (zoning ordinances are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed in favor of landowner)
- Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142 (2000) (zoning restrictions are not to be extended by implication)
- Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v. Tracy, 75 Ohio St.3d 125 (1996) (if ordinance language is unambiguous, apply plain meaning)
- 4522 Kenny Rd., L.L.C. v. Columbus Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 152 Ohio App.3d 526 (2003) (unambiguous ordinance language requires courts to follow the words of the ordinance)
- Paulus v. Paulus, 95 Ohio App.3d 612 (1994) (statutes should be construed to accord with common sense and avoid absurd results)
- Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997) (plain error doctrine in civil appeals applies only in exceptional circumstances)
