Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
798 F.3d 1260
| 10th Cir. | 2015Background
- Kelly Osborne, who is deaf and primarily lip-reads, received a conditional offer to be a plasma center technician (PCT) at BioLife but the offer was rescinded after HR concluded she could not hear plasmapheresis machine alarms or donor verbal calls.
- The PCT position consolidated three prior roles and has three core duties: taking medical history, monitoring donors for adverse reactions, and sample preparation. Monitoring donors (including perceiving/responding to alarms and donor distress) is treated as an essential function.
- Osborne sued under the ADA, proposing accommodations: (1) job restructuring (shift most time to sample prep), (2) installing visual/vibrating alerts on machines, and (3) providing donor call buttons; she did not press the interpreter request on appeal.
- The district court granted summary judgment to BioLife, finding Osborne failed to show she could perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation; both parties appealed (Osborne appeals judgment; BioLife cross-appeals costs).
- The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding genuine disputes of material fact exist about whether visual/vibrating alerts combined with donor call buttons would be reasonable and enable Osborne to perform essential functions; job restructuring was held not reasonable as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on qualification-with-accommodation | Osborne: she identified facially reasonable accommodations (visual/vibrate alerts + call buttons) that would allow performance of essential functions and thus defeated summary judgment | BioLife: accommodations are infeasible/insufficient and any (even de minimis) safety risk makes her unqualified | Reversed: summary judgment inappropriate; factual disputes remain whether accommodations would eliminate any significant risk and enable full performance |
| Job restructuring (shift most duties to sample prep) | Osborne: would reallocate time, not eliminate essential functions; thus reasonable | BioLife: would remove/reduce essential monitoring duty and shift burden to others, fundamentally altering the job | Held unreasonable as a matter of law (fundamentally alters essential functions) |
| Visual/vibrating alerts to replace/augment audible machine alarms | Osborne: equipment modification is a common, facially reasonable accommodation for deaf workers; expert/EEOC guidance supports feasibility | BioLife: modifications may be infeasible, regulated, or insufficient to address non‑machine-related donor reactions | Court: Osborne met initial burden that modification is facially reasonable; BioLife bears burden to show undue hardship/ infeasibility — genuine factual dispute precludes summary judgment; alerts alone may be incomplete |
| Donor call buttons to notify PCTs of distress (used with alerts) | Osborne: call buttons (like hospital nurse calls) would alert her to donor distress; combined with alerts they reasonably enable monitoring; low incidence of serious reactions means no direct‑threat as a matter of law | BioLife: donors may be incapacitated and unable to use buttons; placing burden on donors risks delayed or missed responses; any potential risk defeats accommodation | Court: call buttons + alerts raise triable issues under the ADA/direct‑threat framework; the hypotheticals BioLife advances are too remote to resolve as a matter of law — jury must decide |
| Whether verbal communication is an essential function and whether Osborne can perform it | Osborne: some BioLife staff found her verbal/communicative skills adequate; factual dispute exists | BioLife: contends she cannot meet verbal communication requirements | Court: genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Osborne’s verbal communication ability; not properly resolved on summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (10th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for summary judgment in employment cases)
- Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (burden‑shifting framework for reasonable accommodations)
- US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (Supreme Court 2002) (initial showing that accommodation is reasonable on its face)
- Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2009) (essential‑function analysis and limits on excusing performance of essential duties)
- Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2003) (qualification and essential‑functions two‑step inquiry)
- Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2007) (direct‑threat analysis must be objectively reasonable)
- School Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (Supreme Court 1987) (direct‑threat criteria applied to safety concerns under disability law)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (Supreme Court 1998) (discussion of direct‑threat concept)
- White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995) (burden allocation in accommodation disputes)
- Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877 (10th Cir. 2015) (prima facie ADA showing not onerous)
- McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying direct‑threat criteria in ADA context)
- EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (legislative history and direct‑threat analysis)
- Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996) (genuine‑issue precedent where direct‑threat disputed)