27 I. & N. Dec. 382
BIA2018Background
- Respondent (Mexican national) was convicted in 2009 of knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1); sentence included probation and the offense carried a potential 1-year term.
- Immigration Judge ordered removal and denied cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1); BIA in Matter of Ortega‑Lopez (2013) held § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and thus disqualifies under § 240A(b)(1)(C).
- The Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of whether § 2156(a)(1) is a CIMT, noting its guidance that non‑fraud CIMTs ‘‘almost always’’ involve intent to harm, actual injury, or a protected‑class victim, and queried whether cockfighting (involving chickens) fits that rubric. Ortega‑Lopez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016).
- The BIA reaffirmed that sponsoring/exhibiting in animal fighting is intentionally celebratory of animal suffering, contrary to contemporary moral standards, and therefore categorically a CIMT.
- The BIA also reaffirmed Matter of Cortez: for purposes of INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), the phrase "convicted of an offense under" incorporates only the offense‑specific characteristics (the generic offense and sentencing element) of the cross‑referenced deportability/inadmissibility provisions, not the separate "in and admitted" or temporal admission requirements.
- Consequently, the respondent’s § 2156(a)(1) conviction (one‑year potential sentence) renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 240A(b)(1)(C); the BIA dismissed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (sponsoring/exhibiting an animal in animal fighting) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude | Ortega‑Lopez: statute is overbroad; inclusion of chickens and some statutory breadth means it may not involve moral turpitude in all applications | Government/BIA: statute criminalizes intentional celebration of animal suffering; minimum conduct is reprehensible and meets CIMT elements | Held: Yes. § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a CIMT because it intentionally celebrates animal suffering and violates societal moral standards |
| Whether the CIMT analysis in Ninth Circuit (fraud vs. grave baseness; non‑fraud CIMTs ‘‘almost always’’ require intent to injure, actual injury, or protected victim) limits BIA’s categorical determination | Ortega‑Lopez: Ninth Circuit’s descriptors suggest cockfighting (chickens) may fall outside the usual non‑fraud CIMT paradigms | BIA: those Ninth Circuit categories are non‑exhaustive; moral turpitude analysis is broader and may recognize other morally degrading conduct | Held: BIA may apply a broader, case‑by‑case moral‑turpitude inquiry; the absence of intent to injure a person, injury to persons, or protected‑class victim is not dispositive |
| Whether the phrase "convicted of an offense under" INA § 240A(b)(1)(C) incorporates the full cross‑referenced provisions of INA § 237(a)(2) (including the "in and admitted" and five‑year temporal requirements) | Ortega‑Lopez: cross‑reference should incorporate the entirety of § 237(a)(2) and could be interpreted to treat "admission" as physical entry for cancellation context | BIA/Government: the cross‑reference is limited to offense‑specific characteristics (generic offense and sentencing element); it does not import "in and admitted" or temporal requirements; redefining "admission" to mean "entry" would contradict IIRIRA and statutory context | Held: BIA reaffirmed Matter of Cortez — the phrase incorporates only the offense characteristics, not the "in and admitted" or temporal admission requirements |
| Whether Congress’ legislative history or Ninth Circuit precedent requires a different reading of "offense under" in § 240A(b)(1)(C) | Ortega‑Lopez: House conference report language supports importing deportability/admission elements | BIA: conference report language is imprecise and cannot override the clear statutory text; other statutory cross‑references demonstrate Congress’ intent to treat admission and entry distinctly | Held: Legislative history does not justify reconstructing "admission"; BIA’s limited‑cross‑reference read is most reasonable and maintains statutory coherence |
Key Cases Cited
- Marmolejo‑Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (endorsing BIA’s case‑by‑case moral‑turpitude assessments and deference to agency expertise)
- Escobar v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing categorical approach to CIMT analysis)
- Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing non‑fraud CIMTs as ‘‘almost always’’ involving intent to injure, injury, or protected victims)
- Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding non‑fraud offenses like prostitution can be CIMTs absent injury/protected‑class victim)
- Lozano‑Arredondo v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding BIA to interpret ambiguity in "offense under" cross‑reference in § 240A(b)(1)(C))
- Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (statutory cross‑reference interpretation principles; descriptions cannot impart features the referenced provision lacks)
- Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ("under" in statutory cross‑reference derives meaning from context)