151 F.4th 9
1st Cir.2025Background
- Plaintiffs: twelve named transgender and non‑binary U.S. citizens (representing two certified classes) sued the President, the State Department, the Secretary of State, and the United States to enjoin a Department Passport Policy requiring passports to state the bearer’s biological sex at birth.
- Prior policy allowed applicants to select M, F, or X and did not require the marker to match biological sex; Executive Order No. 14,168 directed the Secretary to implement changes so passports "accurately reflect the holder's sex."
- The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement, finding plaintiffs likely to succeed on an APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim and on an Equal Protection claim grounded in unconstitutional animus; the court made factual findings of immediate, class‑wide irreparable harms (e.g., increased risk of harassment and violence while traveling).
- The government sought a stay pending appeal, arguing the Passport Policy is not reviewable under the APA because it was compelled by the President (invoking Franklin and Bradford) and asserting statutory authority; it also advanced merits defenses and institutional‑interest arguments.
- The First Circuit applied the four‑factor stay test (Nken), concluded the government had not shown a strong likelihood of success on the APA or meaningfully rebutted the animus analysis, found the district court’s irreparable‑harm findings persuasive, and DENIED the stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reviewability under the APA of agency action implementing a presidential directive | Agency action implementing the EO is reviewable under the APA | Policy is unreviewable because it was compelled by the President (Franklin/Bradford) or committed to Presidential discretion | First Circuit: agency action is ordinarily reviewable; govt failed to show strong likelihood that the policy is unreviewable under APA |
| Whether the Passport Policy is arbitrary and capricious under the APA | Policy is arbitrary and capricious and plaintiffs likely to succeed | Policy is a lawful implementation of the EO and not arbitrary | District court found plaintiffs likely to succeed; First Circuit: government did not show a strong likelihood of prevailing on appeal |
| Equal Protection — animus toward transgender people | Policy is motivated by unconstitutional animus and violates Equal Protection | Policy advances legitimate objectives (EO purposes, objective/biological criterion) and is not motivated by animus | First Circuit: govt failed to meaningfully engage the district court’s four‑pronged animus analysis; plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on animus claim stands |
| Stay factors: irreparable harm, balance of harms, public interest | Plaintiffs will suffer immediate, irreparable harms (e.g., increased risk of harassment/violence); public interest favors injunction | Executive‑branch institutional interests and administration of passports will be harmed by injunction | Court: district court’s factual findings of irreparable harm stand; balance of harms and public interest do not favor a stay; stay denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (stay applicant bears burden; four‑factor stay test)
- Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (discusses reviewability limits for presidential action)
- Bradford v. Department of Labor, 101 F.4th 707 (10th Cir. treatment of presidentially compelled agency action)
- New York v. Trump, 133 F.4th 51 (agency action carrying out EO ordinarily subject to APA review)
- Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1 (same—agency action implementing presidential directive is reviewable)
- Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.) (agency rules implementing executive directives are typically reviewable)
- New Jersey v. Trump, 131 F.4th 27 (waiver for failure to meaningfully develop appellate arguments)
- Does 1-3 v. Mills, 39 F.4th 20 (First Circuit discussion of stay factors)
- United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (Supreme Court decision referenced regarding a distinct sex‑discrimination claim)
