978 F.3d 603
8th Cir.2020Background
- In June 2020 Missouri enacted SB 631 (temporary through Dec. 31, 2020) creating a statewide mail-in ballot option while expanding absentee eligibility to include COVID-19 at-risk voters.
- Key statutory difference: absentee ballots may be returned by mail or in person (by voter or a close relative); mail-in ballots must be returned only through USPS and be received by 7:00 p.m. on election day.
- Plaintiffs challenged this differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing the mail-only return requirement risks disenfranchisement due to USPS delays.
- The district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering Missouri to allow mail-in ballots to be returned by the same methods available for absentee ballots; the Secretary of State appealed and obtained a temporary administrative stay.
- The Eighth Circuit considered the Secretary’s motion for a stay pending appeal, applying the four-factor stay test (likelihood on the merits, irreparable harm, injury to others, and public interest).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri’s mail-only return rule for mail-in ballots violates voters’ rights under Anderson-Burdick | The mail-only rule imposes a meaningful risk of total disenfranchisement (USPS delays) and lacks a reasonable justification for treating similar remote voters differently | The rule imposes only a minimal burden; during a pandemic limiting in-person returns for mail-in ballots is a rational, nondiscriminatory exercise of the State’s authority | Majority: stay granted—State showed a strong likelihood of success because the burden is minimal under Anderson-Burdick and the rule is rational in light of pandemic concerns; Dissent: would deny stay, finding a substantial risk of disenfranchisement and inadequate justification for disparate treatment |
| Whether the Secretary demonstrated irreparable harm absent a stay | Injunction prevents enforcement of duly enacted election statute and disrupts legislative authority (harm to voters not emphasized) | State will be irreparably harmed if enjoined from applying its enacted election procedures | Majority: yes—enjoining a duly enacted election statute causes irreparable harm to the State; supports granting stay |
| Whether a stay would substantially injure other parties or the public interest | Injunction prevents disenfranchisement risk for mail-in voters and promotes equal access to ballot-return options | A stay preserves the status quo, reduces last-minute rule changes, and protects election administration and public confidence | Majority: injury to others/public interest outweighed by other factors (stay preserves legislative rule and avoids altering rules on eve of election); Dissent: public interest favors enabling more voters to have ballots counted, so no stay |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (establishes balancing test for burdens on voting rights)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (applies Anderson balancing to election regulations)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (lesser burdens require only reasonable, nondiscriminatory state interests)
- Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987) (four-factor stay test: likelihood on merits, irreparable harm, injury to others, public interest)
- Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (standard for preliminary injunction factors in Eighth Circuit)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (caution against altering election rules close to an election)
- Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (even slight burdens on voting must be justified by sufficient state interests)
- Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (injunctions that bar a State from enforcing statutes can cause irreparable harm to the State)
