123 A.3d 494
Me.2015Background
- At the end of the 127th Maine Legislature’s First Regular Session (statutory adjournment date June 17, 2015), the Legislature failed to complete a timely procedural extension and adjourned June 30, 2015 “until the call of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House” with no date certain.
- Eighty-one bills (per parties’ differing counts) were on the Governor’s desk when the Legislature adjourned; the Governor returned 65 vetoes on July 16, 2015 after the Legislature reconvened at the call of leadership.
- The Speaker/Legislature refused to consider the vetoes, declared the bills enacted, and directed chaptering; the Governor asked the Justices for an advisory opinion whether the June 30 adjournment “prevented the return” of vetoes under Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2.
- The Governor argued either (a) the Legislature lost authority when it failed to extend the session by the statutory date (3 M.R.S. § 2) or (b) the June 30 adjournment, lacking a date certain and occurring at the end of the session, effectively prevented return and triggered the three-day return rule.
- The Legislature argued that only a final adjournment (adjournment sine die) prevents return and that the June 30 adjournment was a temporary adjournment to the call of leadership for veto consideration.
- The Justices considered constitutional text, historical practice in Maine (multiple examples of governors returning vetoes during temporary adjournments), and persuasive federal and state precedent before issuing a unanimous advisory opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (LePage) | Defendant's Argument (Legislature) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What form of adjournment “prevents the return” under Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2? | "Prevent" can be satisfied by an adjournment’s practical effect (e.g., adjournment without date at end of session); not limited to only sine die. | Only a final adjournment (adjournment sine die) prevents return; temporary adjournments do not. | Adjournment sine die (final adjournment) prevents return; temporary adjournments to a date certain or to the call do not. |
| Did the Legislature’s actions/inactions (including failing to extend by June 17 and adjournment to the call on June 30) trigger the constitutional three-day return procedure? | Yes—either because the session ended by operation of 3 M.R.S. § 2 on June 17 or because the June 30 adjournment prevented return. | No—the June 18 extension vote was valid; June 30 adjournment to the call was temporary and did not prevent return. | No. The Court held the three-day procedure was not triggered. The June 18 extension was accepted as valid; June 30 adjournment did not prevent return. |
| Were the 65 bills the Governor returned on July 16 properly before the Legislature for reconsideration? | Yes—Governor returned vetoes when Legislature next met after adjournment and thus they should be reconsidered. | No—the Governor returned them outside the ten-day in-session period; because the adjournment did not prevent return, the bills became law. | No. The Court held those vetoes were untimely; the bills became law (effective per constitutional timing and emergency-status rules). |
| Did the First Regular Session end by operation of law on June 17 under 3 M.R.S. § 2, invalidating actions after that date? | The Legislature failed to extend the session by June 17, so the session ended by operation of statute; subsequent actions (including extension vote June 18) were invalid. | The Legislature controls when it is in session; the June 17 extension order was pending, the June 18 votes were within the Legislature’s power, and no member objected; extension was valid. | The Court rejected the Governor’s argument that the session ended on June 17 by operation of law; it accepted the Legislature’s extension (June 18 vote) as procedurally appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- The Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (U.S. Supreme Court Pocket Veto Case interpreting when adjournment can prevent return)
- Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938) (U.S. Supreme Court narrowing Pocket Veto Case and articulating two purposes of the return/adjournment rule)
- NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (federal separation-of-powers principles and deference to political-branch determinations of session timing)
- Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 238 N.W. 16 (Mich. 1931) (state authority holding only final adjournment prevents return)
- State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 215 N.W. 200 (Minn. 1927) (temporary adjournments do not prevent return; return to officers acceptable)
- Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass. 567 (Mass. 1791) (early opinion distinguishing prorogation/final adjournment from ordinary recess)
- Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 607 (1864) (New Hampshire Justices holding only final adjournment prevents return)
- Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d 405 (Del. 1961) (Delaware Justices analyzing and adopting contrary view but prompting later constitutional amendment)
