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123 A.3d 494
Me.
2015
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Background

  • At the end of the 127th Maine Legislature’s First Regular Session (statutory adjournment date June 17, 2015), the Legislature failed to complete a timely procedural extension and adjourned June 30, 2015 “until the call of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House” with no date certain.
  • Eighty-one bills (per parties’ differing counts) were on the Governor’s desk when the Legislature adjourned; the Governor returned 65 vetoes on July 16, 2015 after the Legislature reconvened at the call of leadership.
  • The Speaker/Legislature refused to consider the vetoes, declared the bills enacted, and directed chaptering; the Governor asked the Justices for an advisory opinion whether the June 30 adjournment “prevented the return” of vetoes under Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2.
  • The Governor argued either (a) the Legislature lost authority when it failed to extend the session by the statutory date (3 M.R.S. § 2) or (b) the June 30 adjournment, lacking a date certain and occurring at the end of the session, effectively prevented return and triggered the three-day return rule.
  • The Legislature argued that only a final adjournment (adjournment sine die) prevents return and that the June 30 adjournment was a temporary adjournment to the call of leadership for veto consideration.
  • The Justices considered constitutional text, historical practice in Maine (multiple examples of governors returning vetoes during temporary adjournments), and persuasive federal and state precedent before issuing a unanimous advisory opinion.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (LePage) Defendant's Argument (Legislature) Held
What form of adjournment “prevents the return” under Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2? "Prevent" can be satisfied by an adjournment’s practical effect (e.g., adjournment without date at end of session); not limited to only sine die. Only a final adjournment (adjournment sine die) prevents return; temporary adjournments do not. Adjournment sine die (final adjournment) prevents return; temporary adjournments to a date certain or to the call do not.
Did the Legislature’s actions/inactions (including failing to extend by June 17 and adjournment to the call on June 30) trigger the constitutional three-day return procedure? Yes—either because the session ended by operation of 3 M.R.S. § 2 on June 17 or because the June 30 adjournment prevented return. No—the June 18 extension vote was valid; June 30 adjournment to the call was temporary and did not prevent return. No. The Court held the three-day procedure was not triggered. The June 18 extension was accepted as valid; June 30 adjournment did not prevent return.
Were the 65 bills the Governor returned on July 16 properly before the Legislature for reconsideration? Yes—Governor returned vetoes when Legislature next met after adjournment and thus they should be reconsidered. No—the Governor returned them outside the ten-day in-session period; because the adjournment did not prevent return, the bills became law. No. The Court held those vetoes were untimely; the bills became law (effective per constitutional timing and emergency-status rules).
Did the First Regular Session end by operation of law on June 17 under 3 M.R.S. § 2, invalidating actions after that date? The Legislature failed to extend the session by June 17, so the session ended by operation of statute; subsequent actions (including extension vote June 18) were invalid. The Legislature controls when it is in session; the June 17 extension order was pending, the June 18 votes were within the Legislature’s power, and no member objected; extension was valid. The Court rejected the Governor’s argument that the session ended on June 17 by operation of law; it accepted the Legislature’s extension (June 18 vote) as procedurally appropriate.

Key Cases Cited

  • The Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (U.S. Supreme Court Pocket Veto Case interpreting when adjournment can prevent return)
  • Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938) (U.S. Supreme Court narrowing Pocket Veto Case and articulating two purposes of the return/adjournment rule)
  • NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (federal separation-of-powers principles and deference to political-branch determinations of session timing)
  • Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 238 N.W. 16 (Mich. 1931) (state authority holding only final adjournment prevents return)
  • State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 215 N.W. 200 (Minn. 1927) (temporary adjournments do not prevent return; return to officers acceptable)
  • Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass. 567 (Mass. 1791) (early opinion distinguishing prorogation/final adjournment from ordinary recess)
  • Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 607 (1864) (New Hampshire Justices holding only final adjournment prevents return)
  • Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d 405 (Del. 1961) (Delaware Justices analyzing and adopting contrary view but prompting later constitutional amendment)
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Case Details

Case Name: Opinion of the Justices
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: Aug 6, 2015
Citations: 123 A.3d 494; 2015 Me. LEXIS 117; 2015 ME 107
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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    Opinion of the Justices, 123 A.3d 494