Opinion No.
Background
- The Texas Attorney General issues an opinion evaluating the scope of authority for a residential appliance installer under Occupations Code chapter 1305.
- A residential appliance installer is a non-electrician licensed to perform residential appliance installation, including pool-related electrical maintenance.
- A pool is defined broadly to include indoor/outdoor pools, hot tubs, spas, and other recreational bathing structures.
- Two interpretive readings are considered: (i) limiting pool-related devices and equipment to residential pools installed as units in small multi-unit dwellings, and (ii) treating pool-related devices as a separate category capable of covering commercial pools.
- The analysis examines statutory text (including 1305.002(12-a) and 1305.002(12-b)) and related definitions, plus agency rule 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 73.10(23).
- The opinion concludes the Legislature intended residential appliance installers to work only on residential pools, not commercial pools.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of residential appliance installer authority on pools | Requestor argued both residential and commercial pools may be covered by the term. | Abbott argued the residential appliance definition limits work to residential pools installed as units in smaller dwellings. | Residential pools only; no authority to work on commercial pools. |
| Effect of punctuation on statutory meaning | Comma suggests separate classification allowing broader coverage. | Abbott rejects comma-based reading; reads statute in context with broader provisions. | Legislative intent aligns with limiting to residential pools despite the comma. |
Key Cases Cited
- Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2009) (statutory interpretation; read in context and grammar but not rigidly)
- City of Corpus Christi v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (deference to agency interpretations when reasonable)
- State v. Hogg, 70 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1934) (avoid rigid grammatical rules if contrary to legislative intent)
- Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist, 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (contextual reading to discern legislative intent)
- Interstate Forwarding Co. v. Vineyard, 3 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1928) (may omit a comma to reflect legislative intent; appellate history)