OPAWL - Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Yost, 747 F.Supp.3d 1065

Plaintiffs, including two associations, two noncitizen lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and one U.S. citizen, challenged Ohio's recently enacted law (Section 121) that restricts noncitizen political contributions and expenditures.
Section 121's definition of "foreign national" includes LPRs (green card holders), unlike federal law, which exempts them from the federal ban on foreign national political spending.
Plaintiffs argued that the law violates the First Amendment by restricting protected political speech and association rights, and also the Equal Protection Clause.
Defendants contended that preventing foreign influence over political processes allows states to exclude noncitizens, including LPRs, from electoral speech activities.
The court analyzed the request for a preliminary injunction, focusing on whether Plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim, and assessed standing and justiciability.
The court ultimately found most of Section 121 constitutional but enjoined its enforcement as to individuals, particularly LPRs, due to insufficient tailoring to the state's interest.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Section 121 violate the First Amendment by restricting LPR political speech?	LPRs have First Amendment rights; the law is overbroad and not narrowly tailored.	State can exclude noncitizens from political process to prevent foreign influence.	Law likely unconstitutional as to LPRs; not closely drawn to interest in preventing foreign influence.
Is Ohio's inclusion of LPRs in "foreign national" definition constitutional?	Section 121 sweeps too broadly, including LPRs with strong U.S. ties.	State's interest in public integrity allows broader exclusion.	Inclusion of LPRs likely unconstitutional; no evidence they threaten integrity of political process.
Is Ohio's restriction on ballot initiative spending by foreign nationals constitutional?	Restrictions on ballot speech risk suppressing protected advocacy.	Ballot initiatives are core self-government, justifying limits to prevent influence.	Bans on Non-LPR foreign nationals' ballot advocacy are narrowly tailored; bans on LPRs are not.
Should a preliminary injunction issue enjoining Section 121 in whole or part?	Entire law is unconstitutional due to breadth and chilling effect.	If any part is unconstitutional, it is severable, so remainder should stand.	Injunction granted only as to enforcement based on individual "foreign national" definition (Division A(2)(a)).

Bluman v. Federal Election Commission, 565 U.S. 1104 (summarily affirmed upholding the constitutionality of federal ban on political spending by foreign nationals, but expressly left open lawfulness of banning LPRs)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (distinction between expenditures and contributions for constitutional scrutiny)
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (importance of narrow tailoring and heightened scrutiny for political speech restrictions)
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (First Amendment incorporated to the states)
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (broad First Amendment protection for political speech and right to hear diverse viewpoints)
Schimmel v. Louisville, 751 F.3d 430 (irreparable harm presumed where First Amendment rights are infringed)
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (underinclusiveness undermines the asserted interest for constitutional tailoring)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (underinclusive laws fail to show compelling interests for speech restrictions)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (limits precedential scope of summary affirmances)
United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697 (Bluman binding on lower courts as to issues actually decided)