Online King LLC, 629 B.R. 340

Debtor Online King LLC filed a Chapter 11 petition and elected Subchapter V on July 10, 2020; Subchapter V requires the debtor alone to file a plan within 90 days (§ 1189(b)).
The 90-day deadline expired on October 8, 2020; the Debtor did not file a plan or seek an extension before that date.
On October 21, 2020 the Debtor moved (signed by counsel, without affidavits) for a retroactive 90‑day extension, citing only generalized reasons: workload, Jewish holidays, competing demands, and the COVID‑19 pandemic.
The court considered (1) whether it may grant retroactive (nunc pro tunc) relief under § 1189(b) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Acevedo Feliciano and (2) whether the Debtor met the substantive § 1189(b) burden to justify an extension.
The record showed the Debtor previously represented it would file within 90 days, filed monthly operating reports showing continued operation, and continued to prosecute other matters near the deadline; the Motion lacked factual support or declarations.
The court denied the Motion: it concluded § 1189(b) permits discretionary retroactive relief but the Debtor failed to meet the stringent, evidentiary burden required to justify an extension.

Issue	Debtor's Argument	Opposing Argument	Held
May the court grant a retroactive (nunc pro tunc) extension of the § 1189(b) 90‑day plan‑filing deadline after it has expired (post‑Acevedo)?	The court may exercise discretion to extend the period retroactively under § 1189(b).	Some authorities question retroactive relief after Acevedo; parties pointed to limits on nunc pro tunc relief.	Court: § 1189(b) is silent on timing and implies the court may grant retroactive relief; thus court need not decide whether Acevedo categorically forbids such relief here.
Does § 1189(b) require a motion for extension be filed before the 90‑day deadline?	No explicit timing requirement in § 1189(b); Debtor filed after the deadline.	Practical argument that moving before deadline is required by other Code provisions and to avoid dismissal risk.	Court: No statutory requirement to file before expiration (contrast § 1121); but moving after deadline is risky because failure to file a plan is "cause" under § 1112 and the debtor bears the burden.
Did the Debtor meet its burden under § 1189(b) to justify a 90‑day extension?	Extension needed because of negotiating workload, Jewish holidays, competing demands, and COVID‑19 disruptions.	Motion lacked affidavits/evidence, was filed after deadline, and record contradicted claimed impediments.	Court: Denied—reasons were conclusory and unsupported; burden under § 1189(b) is stringent and Debtor failed to show circumstances beyond its accountability.

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020) (limits and clarifies use of nunc pro tunc orders)
In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 758 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014) (discusses inherent power to enter orders with retroactive effect)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (statutory omission/inclusion canon—expressio unius)
In re Lundberg, 621 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2020) (interpreting identical § 1221 to permit retroactive extensions where appropriate)
In re Ventura, 615 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2020) (discusses SBRA purpose to streamline Subchapter V and expedited process)
In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2020) (explains heightened standard for extensions under Subchapter V)