Omar Saunders-El v. Eric Rohde
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1557
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Saunders-El was arrested for a burglary; officers claimed he left blood at the scene that matched his DNA. He was released on bond and later acquitted by a jury.
- Saunders-El alleged police had assaulted him, collected his blood, and planted it to frame him; he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process) and Illinois state claims (malicious prosecution, IIED).
- The district court granted summary judgment to officers on the § 1983 claim, holding evidence fabrication cannot support a federal due process claim and dismissed state claims without prejudice.
- On appeal Saunders-El argued the dismissal on summary judgment was improper and that fabrication, and the officers’ alleged failure to disclose it to prosecutors (a Brady theory), violated his due process rights.
- The Seventh Circuit agreed that fabrication can, in some circumstances, violate due process but held Alexander v. McKinney controls: because Saunders-El was released on bond and acquitted, he suffered no constitutionally cognizable liberty deprivation from the alleged fabrication.
- The court also rejected Saunders-El’s Brady theory: Brady does not require police to create or volunteer truthful investigative accounts, and an acquitted defendant cannot transform an evidence-fabrication claim into a constitutional Brady violation here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence fabrication can state a § 1983 due process claim | Fabricating evidence violates due process and supports § 1983 liability | Fabrication claims are essentially state-law malicious prosecution and not cognizable under § 1983 | Evidence fabrication can violate due process, so it may support § 1983 in appropriate circumstances (court rejects categorical bar) |
| Whether Saunders-El’s claim was properly dismissed at summary judgment rather than on a Rule 12 motion | Dismissal on summary judgment was improper if claim required only Rule 12 resolution | Summary judgment properly disposes of legally untenable claims when no genuine fact issue exists | Summary judgment was permissible because claims lacking legal basis present no genuine issue of material fact |
| Whether Saunders-El, who was released on bond and acquitted, suffered a due-process liberty deprivation from fabricated evidence | Fabrication and failure to disclose deprived him of liberty and due process | An acquitted, released-on-bond defendant does not suffer the sort of post-conviction liberty deprivation that Whitlock addresses | Held for defendants: Alexander controls—no due-process violation where the only alleged deprivation was pretrial arrest/release and attendance at trial; acquittal forecloses § 1983 fabrication claim |
| Whether officers’ silence about alleged fabrication states a Brady claim | Failure to inform prosecutors of fabrication withheld exculpatory evidence under Brady | Brady does not require police to create or truthfully narrate investigative facts to prosecutors; such claims are more properly malicious prosecution | Brady theory fails here; precedent rejects extending Brady to compel officers to create or disclose truthful accounts of their investigations, and Alexander precludes a constitutional claim after acquittal |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012) (fabricating evidence used to convict violates due process)
- Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014) (fabrication of evidence/witness testimony violates clearly established due-process rights)
- Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2012) (acquittal and release on bond foreclose fabrication-based due-process claim absent post-arrest liberty deprivation)
- Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001) (malicious-prosecution claims are matters of state law and limit § 1983 use for similar theories)
- Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2010) (caution against shoehorning claims into Fourteenth Amendment when other amendments or state law apply)
- Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2003) (Brady does not obligate police to create truthful exculpatory evidence or to narrate investigation truthfully)