292 F. Supp. 3d 413
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- M.K., a 17-year-old classified under IDEA as emotionally disturbed, has an IEP requiring ~98% general education placement plus counseling and related services.
- On Nov. 6, 2017, M.K. assaulted another student, causing serious injury; school personnel removed him to an interim alternative educational setting and suspended him for 45 days. Homebound tutoring was provided. Criminal charges were filed.
- A Manifestation Determination Review found the conduct was a manifestation of M.K.’s disability, but Haynes sought administrative approval to change placement and filed a due-process complaint on Jan. 25, 2018.
- The 45-day special-circumstances removal expired Jan. 31, 2018; Haynes refused to readmit M.K. pending an administrative hearing expected in early March 2018.
- M.K.’s mother sought a TRO and preliminary injunction ordering Haynes to readmit him under IDEA’s stay-put provision; the TRO was denied and the preliminary injunction was litigated on the traditional four-factor test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does IDEA stay-put require Haynes to readmit M.K. pending the administrative hearing? | Stay-put (34 C.F.R. §300.518) applies because an administrative proceeding is pending; M.K. must remain in his current placement. | Haynes invoked §300.533 and §300.532 to keep M.K. in an interim alternative setting pending appeal/hearing. | Court: Stay-put governs once the school's 45-day §300.530(g) removal expired; school cannot unilaterally extend exclusion beyond 45 days. |
| Can §300.532/§300.533 retroactively validate Haynes’s continued exclusion past 45 days? | N/A (Plaintiff argues stay-put controls until hearing officer rules). | School contends hearing process allows continued removal until hearing officer decision. | Court: Hearing-officer authority under §300.532 can prospectively order 45-day removals, but cannot retroactively ratify time already in excess of §300.530(g). |
| Whether plaintiff is presumptively entitled to injunction under stay-put or court should apply the four-factor test. | Plaintiff invoked the stay-put presumption of entitlement to injunctive relief. | School urged application of traditional four-factor preliminary injunction test to defeat relief. | Court: Agreed parties and precedent allow application of four-factor test to overcome the stay-put presumption. |
| Whether a preliminary injunction should issue (four-factor balancing: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest). | Plaintiff likely to succeed on merits and urged immediate readmission to avoid harm from exclusion. | School argued irreparable harm is absent, injunction would risk safety of others and M.K., and public interest favors school safety. | Court: Found only likelihood of success favored plaintiff; irreparable harm, equities, and public interest favored Haynes. Denied preliminary injunction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (discusses IDEA stay-put and equitable discretion regarding dangerous disabled students)
- Eley v. D.C., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014) (stay-put presumption described for IDEA cases)
- Laster v. D.C., 439 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2006) (school may overcome stay-put presumption by traditional injunction analysis)
- Spencer v. D.C., 416 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006) (application of preliminary-injunction framework in IDEA context)
- Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (courts weigh all four preliminary-injunction factors together)
- Smith v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 582 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (public interest in school safety supports denying injunctive relief requiring readmission)
- Henry v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 29, 70 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.N.H. 1999) (discusses stay-put and preliminary-injunction interplay)