Olson v. Doe, 502 P.3d 398

Doe sought a civil harassment restraining order under Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6 against Olson; the court ordered mediation and the petition was dismissed without prejudice after the parties signed a one-page mediation and confidentiality agreement.
The mediation agreement contained three operative conduct terms (no contact except in writing/if required by law; avoid one another in common areas) and a single nondisparagement clause: "The parties agree not to disparage one another." Term: 3 years.
Doe later filed an administrative HUD/DFEH complaint and an unlimited civil suit alleging sexual battery, harassment, stalking, and related claims against Olson and others.
Olson cross-complained for breach of the mediation agreement and sought damages and specific performance (dismissal/withdrawal of Doe’s claims), asserting Doe breached the nondisparagement clause by filing the administrative and civil complaints.
Doe moved to strike Olson’s cross-complaint under the anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16); the trial court granted the motion in full, the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court held the nondisparagement clause — read in context of the mediation agreement and the § 527.6 proceeding — does not reach statements made in subsequent litigation; Olson failed to show the minimal merit required to defeat Doe’s anti‑SLAPP motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the mediation nondisparagement clause bars or makes Doe liable for statements made in later litigation arising from the same alleged misconduct	The clause broadly prohibits disparaging statements, including in later lawsuits; Doe breached by filing HUD and civil complaints	The clause was intended to prevent personal contact and third‑party gossip, not to waive the right to petition or to bar litigation; § 527.6 context and agreement language show no such waiver	The clause does not apply to statements made in later litigation; Olson failed to show probability of success on breach element, so anti‑SLAPP motion stands
Whether the litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47(b)) bars Olson’s contract claim for statements made in litigation	(Olson) argued his contract claim could proceed despite privilege	(Doe) argued privilege and petitioning protection shield her filings	The Court did not decide this issue because Olson failed to meet the anti‑SLAPP burden; privilege issue left unresolved

Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (2002) (anti‑SLAPP may apply to breach‑of‑contract claims; a party who validly contracts not to speak may waive anti‑SLAPP protection)
Claxton v. Waters, 34 Cal.4th 367 (2004) (construe broad release language in light of statutory context; releases limited to scheme’s scope)
Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, 7 Cal.5th 781 (2019) (confidentiality provisions with detailed terms can show parties intended to bind speakers and defeat anti‑SLAPP)
Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006) (litigation privilege is a substantive defense relevant to anti‑SLAPP second‑step analysis)
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (1999) (filing litigation and seeking administrative action are petitioning activities protected by the constitutional right to petition)