929 F.3d 830
7th Cir.2019Background
- Oliver Collins, a tenured Notre Dame electrical engineering professor, was investigated for diverting NSF grant funds to purchase non‑budget equipment and for personal use; Notre Dame suspended him and initiated dismissal proceedings under its Academic Articles.
- An informal mediation effort involved Father John Coughlin and Dr. Paul Huber; Coughlin later served on the formal three‑member Hearing Committee (with Huber as alternate).
- The Hearing Committee sustained six charges (three in full, three in part) by clear and convincing evidence and recommended dismissal; an Appeal Board unanimously affirmed and the university president dismissed Collins on June 2, 2010.
- Collins sued Notre Dame for breach of contract in federal court, arguing (inter alia) that Coughlin’s dual role required automatic recusal under §8(c)(3) of the Academic Articles; the district court granted summary judgment to Collins on that procedural ground, voiding the dismissal.
- After Collins pleaded guilty in federal court (18 U.S.C. §666) to theft of grant funds, Notre Dame re‑adjudicated and again dismissed him; the district court nevertheless awarded Collins lost wages from June 2, 2010 to his conviction date, relying on the earlier procedural ruling.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed: it held §8(c)(3) does not mandate automatic recusal for any participation in informal resolution, found no evidentiary showing of bias by Coughlin, and concluded undisputed facts (including Collins’s guilty plea) established “serious cause” as a matter of law, entitling Notre Dame to judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Collins' Argument | Notre Dame's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §8(c)(3) of the Academic Articles required automatic recusal of any Hearing Committee member who participated in informal resolution | Any participation in informal mediation triggers automatic recusal under the provision | The provision requires recusal only if participation created bias or an interest; participation alone is not dispositive | Held for Notre Dame: no automatic recusal; recusal only where participation gives rise to bias/interest and record contains no such showing |
| Whether procedural breach (Coughlin’s service) voided the 2010 dismissal | The procedural defect rendered the dismissal void and thus Collins suffered breach of contract | No procedural breach occurred; university complied with contract | Held for Notre Dame: no procedural breach; district court erred to void dismissal on that ground |
| Whether there was “serious cause” to dismiss Collins under Academic Articles | Collins contended the committee’s findings did not meet the contract’s definition of serious cause | Notre Dame argued the Hearing Committee findings (and later guilty plea) established serious cause under Article III §8(b) | Held for Notre Dame: undisputed facts (and Collins’s felony plea) establish serious cause as a matter of law |
| Whether Collins proved damages causally resulting from any contractual breach | Collins sought lost compensation until retirement and claimed other tort/ statutory claims | Notre Dame argued any damages award was improper because there was no breach and any procedural error was immaterial to outcome | Held for Notre Dame: because no breach, Collins entitled to no damages; cross‑appeal issues rendered moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Haegert v. University of Evansville, 977 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. 2012) (elements for breach of contract under Indiana law)
- Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908 (Ind. 2017) (plain‑meaning rule for unambiguous contract language)
- Taracorp, Inc. v. NL Industries, Inc., 73 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1996) (inference from different language in parallel contract provisions)
- Vesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2018) (contract construed as whole to resolve linguistic inconsistencies)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (U.S. 2014) (principle that different language in proximate provisions suggests different meaning)
- Roberts v. Columbia College Chicago, 821 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment legal conclusions)