456 P.3d 760
Utah2019Background
- Mother and Husband were married; during a separation Mother conceived a child with Olguin. The child was born during the marriage and Husband was listed on the birth certificate.
- Genetic testing later showed a 99.99% probability that Olguin is the biological father; Olguin had parent-time for several years but contact ended after an injury during a visit.
- Olguin filed a petition to adjudicate paternity; Mother moved to dismiss, relying on Utah Code § 78B-15-607(1) and the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision in R.P. v. K.S.W. to argue alleged fathers lack standing when a child is born during a marriage.
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that denying Olguin standing would violate procedural due process (though it declined to find a substantive due process right) and certified interlocutory appeals of its orders.
- The Utah Supreme Court noted a companion decision (Castro v. Lemus) holding the UUPA grants alleged fathers standing under § 78B-15-602(3), rendering Olguin’s constitutional challenges moot; the Court affirmed denial of dismissal on the alternative ground that Olguin has statutory standing and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 78B-15-607(1) bars an alleged father from challenging paternity when a child is born in a marriage | Olguin: he has standing to adjudicate paternity (and relied on § 78B-15-602(3)) | Mother: § 607(1) (as interpreted in R.P.) limits standing to mother and presumed father | Held: Court affirmed that UUPA grants Olguin standing; § 607(1) does not bar challenge when read with § 602(3) (per companion Castro) |
| Whether denying standing would violate procedural due process | Olguin: denial would deprive him of liberty interest and meaningful opportunity to be heard | Mother: R.P. and Michael H. foreclose the claim; statutory interpretation controls | Held: Court did not decide the constitutional question because statutory standing was dispositive; constitutional claim rendered moot by statutory holding |
| Whether Olguin has a substantive due process right to parent the child | Olguin: parental liberty interest supports substantive due process protection | Mother: Michael H. forecloses such a substantive-right claim in this context | Held: Court declined to resolve substantive due process; not necessary to the disposition |
| Whether granting standing terminates Husband’s parental rights or whether pretrial evidentiary rulings are reviewable now | Olguin: standing is necessary to seek adjudication (not an immediate termination) | Mother/Husband: allowing challenge infringes Husband’s marital/parental rights; district court limited trial issues | Held: Court held only that standing exists—no finding on paternity or termination; declined to review district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings on interlocutory appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court plurality addressing due-process limits on natural fathers’ challenges to presumed paternity)
- R.P. v. K.S.W., 320 P.3d 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (interpreted § 78B-15-607(1) to limit standing to mother and presumed father)
- Madsen v. Wash. Mut. Bank fsb, 199 P.3d 898 (Utah 2008) (appellate court may affirm on alternative grounds apparent in the record)
- Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158 (Utah 2002) (same principle allowing affirmation on any sustainable legal ground)
- Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 248 P.3d 44 (Utah 2010) (record must contain sufficient uncontroverted evidence to support an alternative ground on appeal)