Oless Brumfield v. William Dodd, 749 F.3d 339

US filed a motion on August 22, 2013 seeking a permanent injunction against the Louisiana voucher program unless the state obtained authorization from the relevant desegregation court.
The Brumfield v. Dodd desegregation order prohibits public funds or other assistance to racially discriminatory or segregated private schools and created a certification process for private-school eligibility.
Parents of children receiving vouchers moved to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing the injunction; the district court denied intervention as lacking a protectable interest.
After a September 18 order, the US supplemented its motion, contending the relief sought had shifted to data-sharing and monitoring, rather than the original injunction.
The district court maintained that intervention was unavailable unless the original relief was sought, but allowed a renewed intervention motion if the US sought the original remedy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the parents have a legally protectable interest	Parents have an interest in voucher access and equal educational opportunities.	The United States contends the parents lack a cognizable interest given the changed relief.</	Yes; parents have a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the voucher program.
Whether disposition of the action may impair the parents' ability to protect their interests	Change or modification of the desegregation decree could affect voucher availability or school choice.	As relief is now about data sharing, there is no impairment to parents' interests.	Yes; disposition may impair access to vouchers and choice, satisfying impairment.
Whether the parents' interests would be inadequately represented by existing parties	State has broader interests, potentially diverging from parents' goals; representation may be inadequate.	State represents public interest and the program.	Yes; representation may be inadequate, and the presumption of adequate representation does not apply here.

Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) (defines adequate interest and impregnation of rights for intervention; burden minimal for movants)
NOPSI, 732 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc; zone-of-interest considerations relevant to intervention)
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversal of denial of intervention; presumes adequate representation may be lacking when interests diverge)
Black Fire Fighters Ass’n of Dallas v. City of Dallas, 19 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 1994) (decree’s interference with recruitment/promotion can justify intervention)
United States v. Perry County Board of Education, 567 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1978) (desegregation context; parents can intervene where policy disputes affect education)
Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (illustrates impairment to access in a group context and relevant to intervention theory)