869 N.W.2d 452
S.D.2015Background
- Terry Oleson was indicted on multiple sexual-offense charges and faced a habitual-offender enhancement; he pled guilty to first-degree rape in February 2008 under a plea agreement dismissing other counts.
- At arraignment (same judge, ~70 days earlier) the court expressly advised Oleson of the right against self-incrimination; at the change-of-plea hearing the court canvassed Boykin rights but did not specifically mention the privilege against self-incrimination or that a guilty plea waives it.
- Oleson was represented by counsel, was 42, had multiple prior convictions (six prior guilty pleas), and admitted at the habeas hearing that he understood he would have to discuss facts at sentencing and in the presentence report.
- He did not file a direct appeal; about five years later he petitioned for habeas relief alleging (1) failure to advise of right against self-incrimination/waiver, (2) lack of voluntariness, (3) lack of factual basis, and (4) ineffective assistance.
- The habeas court found the record demonstrated Oleson knew of the privilege and that his plea was knowing and voluntary; the court denied relief but granted certificate of probable cause to appeal the Boykin-waiver issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Oleson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure at plea hearing to advise that a guilty plea waives the privilege against self-incrimination invalidates the plea | Oleson: the plea is unconstitutional because the plea court did not inform him that pleading guilty waives the privilege against self-incrimination | State: the privilege had been explained at arraignment by the same judge ~70 days earlier and the plea colloquy otherwise conveyed waiver of constitutional rights | Held: Court affirmed habeas denial — prior arraignment advisement plus plea colloquy and other factors made the plea knowingly and voluntarily entered |
| Whether absence of the specific advisement constitutes a "complete absence" of Boykin canvassing requiring per se reversal | Oleson: omission is equivalent to the complete absence in prior cases (Monette, Rosen, Bilben) that required reversal | State: record is not silent — two Boykin rights were canvassed at plea and self-incrimination was explained at arraignment | Held: Not a "complete absence"; therefore court applied totality-of-the-circumstances rather than automatic reversal |
| Whether totality of the circumstances shows the plea was knowing and voluntary | Oleson: lack of specific advisement shows he did not knowingly waive the privilege | State: factors (age, counsel, plea agreement, prior convictions, recent arraignment advisement, plea colloquy) support knowing and voluntary waiver | Held: Totality favors the State — Oleson failed to prove by a preponderance that his plea was not knowing and voluntary |
| Whether Oleson met habeas burden of proof to overturn final judgment | Oleson: omission of specific wording suffices to overturn plea on collateral review | State: habeas imposes a preponderance burden and presumption of regularity; mere omission does not meet that burden | Held: Oleson did not meet the preponderance standard; habeas relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea waives right against self-incrimination, jury trial, confrontation; courts may not presume waiver from a silent record)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (determinative inquiry is whether plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly under the totality of the circumstances)
- Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (U.S. 1992) (record must affirmatively show plea was knowing and voluntary)
- Monette v. Weber, 771 N.W.2d 920 (S.D. 2009) (discussing when absence of canvassing renders plea invalid; adopted in-state two-step approach)
- Rosen v. Weber, 810 N.W.2d 763 (S.D. 2012) (applied Monette two-step approach reversing where no Boykin canvassing occurred)
- State v. Bilben, 846 N.W.2d 336 (S.D. 2014) (reversed where there was a complete absence of Boykin advisement)
- State v. Apple, 759 N.W.2d 283 (S.D. 2008) (totality-of-the-circumstances factors for voluntariness analysis)
- Moeller v. State, 511 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1994) (specific recitation of Boykin rights is not always required; other record evidence may show a knowing waiver)