Old Utica School Preservation, Inc. v. Utica Township
2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 165
Ind. Ct. App.2014Background
- GCCSC conveyed the former Utica Elementary School to Utica Township by quitclaim deed in 2002; the deed stated the property "shall be used by Utica Township solely for park and recreation purposes" consistent with Indiana statute.
- Township lacked funds to maintain the building; it fell into disrepair and was later leased (2011) to Jacobs Well, Inc., a nonprofit that invested in renovations and agreed to permit some community use.
- Citizens (Old Utica School Preservation, and three adjacent landowners) sued for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging the lease and Jacobs Well’s intended uses violated the deed/statute (e.g., residential/halfway-house use).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Jacobs Well, finding the Citizens lacked standing as contract parties or intended third‑party beneficiaries.
- On appeal, the court considered whether the Citizens could invoke Indiana’s public standing doctrine to challenge the public‑use restriction in the deed/statute.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the Citizens have public standing to pursue their claim; it did not decide whether the lease actually violates the statute or deed restrictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Citizens have standing to challenge township/tenant use of gifted school property restricted to park/recreation? | Citizens: public standing applies because enforcement of I.C. §20-23-6-9(d) involves a public right (enjoyment/administration of public park property). | Jacobs Well/Township: Citizens lack standing because they are not parties to the deed nor intended third‑party beneficiaries. | Yes — Citizens have standing under the public standing doctrine; case remanded for further proceedings. |
| Is the deed language a restrictive covenant enforceable by Citizens? | Citizens: deed restriction (per statute) limits non‑park/recreation uses, so enforceable. | Defendants: enforcement limited to parties/beneficiaries; Citizens lack contract standing. | Court assumed deed is a statutory restriction but did not decide enforceability by Citizens beyond standing; left substantive question open. |
| Should the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal be upheld? | Citizens: dismissal was error because standing exists and factual disputes remain. | Defendants: dismissal proper for lack of standing. | Reversed — summary judgment dismissed for being premature as to standing issue. |
| Must property revert or are lease/non‑recreational uses addressed by statute? | Citizens: statutory scheme suggests public interest in park use; remedies should be available. | Defendants: statute does not clearly prohibit leasing or alternate uses; facts matter. | Court: statute is ambiguous about post‑gift contingencies; did not resolve substantive remedy — noted legislative gap and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. 2003) (recognizing public‑standing exception where plaintiff enforces a public right under statute)
- State ex rel. Berkshire v. City of Logansport, 928 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citizen has public standing to challenge municipal management of public park)
- Wampler v. State ex rel. Alexander, 47 N.E. 1068 (Ind. 1897) (historic support for citizen interest in enforcement of public laws)