Okorie v. L. A. Unified Sch. Dist.
14 Cal. App. 5th 574
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2017Background
- Okorie, a long‑time LAUSD teacher, alleged a pattern of harassment, humiliation, and adverse employment actions by his principal (Hughes), an LAUSD investigator (Jackson), and LAUSD after a molestation allegation surfaced in 2014. He was reassigned, placed on home leave, later sent to an ESC “teacher jail,” and LAUSD recovered district computers from his home pursuant to a warrant. Plaintiffs did not allege termination.
- Complaint pleaded eight causes of action (FEHA claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to prevent; IIED; defamation; § 1983), using an "accumulation" theory that lumped many statements/acts together under “Facts Common to All Causes of Action.”
- Defendants moved solely under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16) to strike the entire complaint, arguing the gravamen was protected speech/communications connected to LAUSD’s internal investigation.
- Trial court granted the anti‑SLAPP motion, finding the complaint’s gravamen was investigation‑related communications and that Plaintiffs failed to show prima facie evidence to establish a probability of success; Plaintiffs appealed.
- On appeal, the court held (1) the principal thrust of Plaintiffs’ claims was protected communicative conduct tied to the internal investigation (not merely incidental), and (2) Plaintiffs failed at step two to show a probability of prevailing on discrimination, failure‑to‑prevent, IIED, harassment, or § 1983 claims due to lack of admissible evidence (reliance on self‑serving declaration and character witnesses).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether anti‑SLAPP applies to a complaint alleging both protected and unprotected conduct (mixed claims) | Anti‑SLAPP should not apply because complaint includes unprotected adverse employment decisions (reassignments) alongside protected communications. | The gravamen/principal thrust of the complaint is protected speech/communications related to the investigation; thus anti‑SLAPP applies to the claims. | The court applied the gravamen/principal‑thrust analysis and held the complaint’s core targeted protected investigation‑related communications, so anti‑SLAPP applied. |
| Whether investigation‑related communications are protected activity under § 425.16 | Park v. CSU (argued) limits anti‑SLAPP where speech only evidences a discriminatory decision. | Internal investigations and communications are official proceedings or communicative acts protected by § 425.16. | Court found investigation communications are protected activity and here were the injury‑producing conduct (not merely evidence). |
| Whether Plaintiffs showed a probability of prevailing on FEHA, IIED, harassment claims | Plaintiffs relied on Okorie’s declaration and character witness declarations to show discriminatory animus and severe distress. | Plaintiffs failed to provide admissible, non‑self‑serving evidence of discriminatory motive or extreme conduct; Defendants proffered nondiscriminatory reasons. | Court held Plaintiffs failed step two: self‑serving, uncorroborated declarations insufficient to show probability of success; claims stricken. |
| Whether the § 1983 claim survived anti‑SLAPP given it named LAUSD only | Plaintiffs argued they could amend to name individuals after discovery. | The complaint as pleaded sued LAUSD only; LAUSD is immune and the current pleading fails. | Court affirmed strike of § 1983 claim — must evaluate the pleading as filed; amendment not allowed at SLAPP stage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) (a special motion to strike can target particular claims or allegations within pleaded counts; anti‑SLAPP analysis focuses on the acts giving rise to each claim)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) (speech that merely supplies evidence of a discriminatory decision is incidental and does not convert a discrimination claim into one arising from protected speech)
- Simpson Strong‑Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, 49 Cal.4th 12 (Cal. 2010) (describes SLAPPs and the remedial purpose of § 425.16)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) (only claims that both arise from protected activity and lack minimal merit are SLAPPs)
- Miller v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal.App.4th 1373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (internal investigations and official reports by government employers constitute protected communicative activity under § 425.16)