214 Cal. App. 4th 822
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Ogundare/Pacific sought writ to set aside a one-year debarment by DLSE for alleged willful public works violations with intent to defraud.
- DLSE conducted investigations in 2007–2008 on Delano, Madera, and Exeter projects, resulting in wage assessments and the debarment proceedings.
- DLSE issued a statement of decision finding willful violations and intent to defraud, and debarment for one year.
- Trial court applied independent-judgment review, concluding no credible evidence of intent to defraud and granting the writ.
- DLSE appealed, arguing the trial court used the wrong standard and that substantial evidence supported intent to defraud.
- The appellate court agreed, reversed the trial court, and remanded with instructions to deny the writ and affirm DLSE’s debarment decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for administrative mandamus | Pacific: independent judgment should apply due to vested rights | DLSE: independent review unnecessary; substantial evidence standard applies | Substantial evidence governs; independent-judgment not required |
| Whether trial court applied correct standard of review | Trial court erred by using independent judgment | DLSE contends independent judgment appropriate for vested rights | Trial court erred; should apply substantial evidence review |
| Sufficiency of evidence of intent to defraud | Record lacks credible proof of intent to defraud | Evidence shows intentional misstatement of payroll records and hours | Substantial evidence supports intent to defraud |
| Debarment as remedy | Debarment improper absent intent to defraud | Debarment warranted by willful violations with intent to defraud | Debarment sua sponte supported under §1777.1 with intent to defraud; writ reversed and DLSE’s decision affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Wences v. City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal.App.4th 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (discusses fundamental vested rights and review standards)
- Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., 11 Cal.3d 633 (Cal. 1974) (establishes independent-judgment vs substantial-evidence framework)
- Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130 (Cal. 1971) (fundamental rights and standard of review guidance)
- JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 142 Cal.App.4th 1046 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (substantial evidence review for non-fundamental-right cases)
- Rand v. Board of Psychology, 206 Cal.App.4th 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (fundamental rights and licensure context)
- Kawasaki Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.App.4th 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (economic interest not always fundamental right; standard varies)
- Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal.App.3d 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (examples of economic regulatory decisions)
- Northern Inyo Hosp. v. Fair Emp. Practice Com., 38 Cal.App.3d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (definition of substantial evidence standard applied to agency findings)
- Housing Development Co. v. Hoschler, 85 Cal.App.3d 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (permissible to apply substantial-evidence review when trial court misapplied standard)
- County of San Diego v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, 148 Cal.App.3d 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (definition of substantial evidence)