298 A.3d 859
Md.2023Background
- Plaintiff Jamaiya Oglesby lived at 2000 E. North Ave., Apt. 202 (a pre-1950 schoolhouse conversion) from Dec. 1998 to early 2002; building inspections and later testing revealed lead-based paint in multiple areas.
- Oglesby had three childhood blood-lead level (BLL) tests: 2 µg/dL (Apr. 1999), 5.5 µg/dL (Mar. 2002), and 4 µg/dL (Aug. 2004). She later underwent neuropsychological and vocational evaluations documenting cognitive deficits and an IQ of 80.
- Plaintiff designated Dr. Steven Caplan (pediatrician) to opine that exposure at the property was a significant contributing cause of her cognitive injuries and that lead exposure produced an approximate 3–4 point IQ loss based on extrapolation from the Canfield and Lanphear studies.
- Defendants moved to preclude Dr. Caplan and for summary judgment. The circuit court excluded all of Dr. Caplan’s opinion testimony (finding factual problems and methodological defects) and entered summary judgment for defendants; the Appellate Court affirmed.
- The Maryland Supreme Court reversed: it held the trial court abused its discretion by resolving disputed facts and excluding Dr. Caplan’s causation opinion (except as to IQ loss), remanded for a Rochkind (Daubert-style) reliability hearing on the IQ-loss calculations, and reversed the summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony that the property was a source and a significant contributing factor to plaintiff’s injuries (source & source-causation) | Oglesby: Dr. Caplan reviewed records, building inspections, BLLs, and lay testimony; those facts supply an adequate basis for his opinions and disputed facts go to the jury. | Defendants: Dr. Caplan relied on limited/selected data and failed to exclude other sources; thus he lacked an adequate supply of data. | The Court held the circuit court abused its discretion by resolving disputed facts; Dr. Caplan had sufficient factual basis to opine that the property was a reasonably probable source and a significant contributing factor (except as to quantified IQ loss). |
| Admissibility of expert’s specific IQ‑loss opinion (methodology using Canfield and Lanphear) | Oglesby: Extrapolation from Canfield/Lanphear is accepted in Maryland; expert used plaintiff’s documented BLLs and clinical findings to estimate point loss. | Defendants: The studies were misapplied (linear extrapolation, peak vs. average BLL, improper averaging/AUC); methodology not reliably explained. | The Court remanded for a Rochkind (Daubert) hearing to determine whether Dr. Caplan’s calculations and use of the Canfield and Lanphear studies reliably support a 3–4 point IQ‑loss opinion. |
| Whether the trial court improperly resolved disputed factual issues in a gatekeeping ruling | Oglesby: Trial court impermissibly took credibility/ factual disputes away from the jury; experts may assume disputed facts supported by evidence. | Defendants: Circuit court reasonably found factual gaps and incorrect information that made the expert unreliable. | The Court held the trial court improperly resolved material factual disputes and therefore abused its discretion in excluding the expert wholly. |
| Whether summary judgment was warranted after exclusion of Dr. Caplan | Oglesby: Even without the IQ‑loss opinion, the record (lead tests, building condition, BLL timing, witnesses) creates a reasonable probability supporting negligence causation. | Defendants: Without Dr. Caplan’s causation testimony plaintiff cannot connect exposure to injury; summary judgment appropriate. | The Court held summary judgment was erroneous: Oglesby presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie negligence case (as to source and non‑IQ injuries); case remanded for trial or further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (Md. 2020) (adopted Daubert-style reliability assessment for expert testimony)
- Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 396 (Md. 2018) (explains adequacy of factual basis and reliable methodology under Md. R. 5-702)
- Levitas v. Christian, 454 Md. 233 (Md. 2017) (expert may rely on other doctors’ reports and Lanphear methodology to ‘rule in’ a property)
- Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23 (Md. 2015) (expert reliance on pooled lead/IQ studies affects weight, not automatic inadmissibility)
- Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith, 446 Md. 611 (Md. 2016) (standard for ruling a property a reasonably probable source at summary judgment)
- Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc., 453 Md. 251 (Md. 2017) (discusses methods to ‘rule in’ a property as source; direct evidence of lead can obviate ruling-out requirement)
- Ross v. Housing Auth. of Balt. City, 430 Md. 648 (Md. 2013) (explains causation links and when expert causation may be insufficient)
- Frankel v. Deane, 480 Md. 682 (Md. 2022) (trial court may not decide credibility/resolve competing factual inferences when assessing expert admissibility)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (federal standard requiring court gatekeeping on reliability of expert methodology)