of Colby, 2021 COA 31

Decedent Carol Ann Colby’s will provided that her primary residence, if not “claimed” by family, be sold and the net proceeds evenly distributed to her two daughters.
Kellie Johnson was named executor and later appointed personal representative; she distributed the will and conducted probate proceedings.
Kathryn Town-Statham (Town) sent communications (an email and attorney conversations, pre-appointment) asserting a right to the home or half its value; Lisa Smith submitted a written request for the residence after appointment.
The district court rejected Town’s assertion because her communications preceded appointment and thus (it concluded) did not comply with § 15-12-804 governing the manner of presenting creditor claims; the court approved final settlement awarding the residence to Smith.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding § 15-12-804 governs creditor claims against an estate, not a devisee’s demand under a will, and remanded for the district court to determine whether Town’s communications constituted a valid “claim” under the ordinary meaning of the testator’s will.

Issue	Town's Argument	Johnson's Argument	Held
Whether § 15-12-804 (manner of presenting claims) applies to a devisee’s demand for a devise under a will	§ 15-12-804 governs only creditor claims; it does not constrain a beneficiary’s demand under the will	Town’s pre-appointment communications failed to comply with § 15-12-804 and thus are invalid	Reversed: § 15-12-804 applies to creditor claims only and does not bar a devisee’s demand under the will
Whether Town’s informal pre-appointment communications constituted a valid “claim” under the Will (meaning of “claim”)	Town says her email and attorney communications were sufficient to “claim” the residence under the Will	Johnson contends those communications were informal, not a valid claim for the residence	Remanded: district court must determine the content of the communications and whether, under the ordinary meaning of “claim” in the Will, they constituted a valid claim; if only a claim for value, court must decide whether that suffices
Motions for attorney fees and sanctions arising from briefing delays	Town opposed dismissal and later sought fees in reply	Johnson moved to dismiss and sought fees but failed to adequately support the fee request in briefing	Denied: appellate court accepted Town’s late brief and denied Johnson’s fee request for lack of proper substantiation; Town’s fee request denied for procedural deficiency

Murphy v. Glenn, 964 P.2d 581 (Colo. App. 1998) (a will contest or distribution dispute is not a claim against the estate under § 15-12-803)
Martel v. Stafford, 603 A.2d 345 (Vt. 1991) (under the UPC, a "creditor" equates to one who holds a claim against the estate)
Estate of Powers, 552 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1996) (nonclaim statutes apply only to claims that would reduce the estate corpus)
Steen & Berg Co. v. Berg, 713 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 2006) (assertion of beneficiary rights under a will is not a claim against the estate)
Estate of Gardner, 845 P.2d 1247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (creditor-claim statutes do not govern devisees’ challenges to distribution)
Matter of Estate of Pallister, 770 P.2d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (assertion of rights under a will is not a claim against the estate)
O'Connor v. Immele, 43 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1950) (distinguishing beneficiary property rights from creditor claims)
Heinneman v. Colorado College, 374 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1962) (primary rule: effectuate testator’s intent when construing a will)