Odyssey Healthcare Operating A. LP v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
2015 Ark. App. 459
Ark. Ct. App.2015Background
- Odyssey Healthcare Operating, a licensed hospice provider, was audited by a CMS-selected contractor for hospice services from 2006–2009; the contractor reviewed 43 patient records and recommended recoupment for 13 patients totaling $315,473.52.
- Odyssey appealed; an administrative hearing before a DHS ALJ lasted four days; DHS dismissed two claims and reduced one recoupment; the ALJ issued a 123‑page decision finding 3 services medically necessary and 8 not, recommending recoupment of $242,446.11.
- The ALJ’s decision became final agency action on February 19, 2014; Odyssey appealed to Pulaski County Circuit Court, which affirmed in a brief order; Odyssey then appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
- Central legal standards: Medicaid coverage requires services be both “medically necessary” and for a “terminally ill” person (terminal = ≤ six months prognosis); appellate review of agency decisions is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings.
- Odyssey raised several challenges: (1) DHS used non‑promulgated external guidelines (NGS) to determine medical necessity; (2) DHS failed to apply the statutory presumption favoring treating physicians (Ark. Code Ann. § 20‑77‑1708(a)); (3) alleged due‑process violations; and (4) claimed DHS lost subject‑matter jurisdiction after statutory amendments shifted adjudicators to the Department of Health.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Odyssey) | Defendant's Argument (DHS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of non‑promulgated guidelines to determine medical necessity | DHS relied on NGS guidelines not adopted by DHS; using them was reversible error — only DHS definitions should control | ALJ treated NGS guidelines as one informational tool among many and applied Arkansas’ statutory/regulatory definitions of medical necessity and terminal illness | Affirmed: ALJ’s use of external guidelines as part of a full medical review was permissible; substantial evidence supported the findings |
| Presumption favoring treating physician under Ark. Code Ann. § 20‑77‑1708(a) | The statute requires deference to treating physicians, so DHS should have accepted those medical judgments | The presumption is rebuttable; ALJ must state how it was overcome, which she did on a patient‑by‑patient basis | Affirmed: ALJ complied with statute by explaining when and how the presumption was rebutted; Odyssey did not challenge the specific findings |
| Due process claim for alleged regulatory/statutory noncompliance | DHS’s procedural or regulatory failures deprived Odyssey of due process | Issue was not raised before the ALJ or circuit court, so it is not preserved for appeal | Dismissed on procedural grounds: unpreserved; appellate court declined to address it |
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction after Medicaid Fairness Act amendment | Because the Act later required DOH ALJs to hear Medicaid provider appeals, Odyssey argued DHS lost jurisdiction before the ALJ decision | Section 20‑77‑1704 did not strip DHS of authority; it only changed which agency’s ALJs are to be used and directed that DHS rules govern decisions | Affirmed: Not a true subject‑matter‑jurisdiction defect; issue was not preserved and statute did not remove DHS’s jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. R.C., 368 Ark. 660, 249 S.W.3d 797 (2007) (appellate review of agency action is limited and directed to agency decision)
- C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 368 Ark. 540, 247 S.W.3d 870 (2007) (substantial‑evidence standard governs review of administrative findings)
- Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Thompson, 331 Ark. 181, 959 S.W.2d 46 (1998) (scope of judicial review of administrative decisions)
- Reed v. Arvis Harper Bail Bonds, Inc., 2010 Ark. 338, 368 S.W.3d 69 (2010) (definition and application of substantial evidence standard)
- Collie v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 370 Ark. 180, 258 S.W.3d 367 (2007) (agency decision supported by substantial evidence cannot be arbitrary or capricious)
- Mountain Pure, LLC v. Little Rock Wastewater Util., 2011 Ark. 258, 383 S.W.3d 347 (2011) (issues must be raised first at the administrative level to be preserved)
- Vibo Corp., Inc. v. State ex rel. McDaniel, 2011 Ark. 124, 380 S.W.3d 411 (2011) (distinguishing true subject‑matter‑jurisdiction defects that may be raised at any time)
- Dunn‑Wright v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 2015 Ark. App. 152, 457 S.W.3d 667 (2015) (preservation rules for agency appeals)
- McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989) (definition of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
