Odom, Stephen Demond
PD-1600-15
| Tex. App. | Dec 21, 2015Background
- Appellant Stephen D. Odom was convicted by a jury of injury to a child and sentenced to life; the Ninth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The State sought discretionary review to challenge that reversal.
- At trial Odom testified in his defense and during cross‑examination stated he "did everything" the police asked and denied being uncooperative.
- The prosecutor sought to impeach Odom by eliciting that he had been asked to take a polygraph and never did so. The trial court allowed questioning about the polygraph after finding Odom had "opened the door."
- Odom objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 and existing Texas precedent barring polygraph evidence; the trial court overruled and allowed the impeachment questioning.
- The Ninth Court of Appeals held that questions about taking a polygraph (and polygraph results) are inadmissible in Texas and that admitting such questioning was prejudicial; it reversed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Odom) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of impeachment by reference to defendant's failure to take a polygraph | Polygraph refusal evidence is admissible impeachment under trial court discretion (Tex. R. Evid. 611/403) when used to show uncooperativeness or to rebut a volunteered, misleading statement | Polygraph existence and questions about taking a polygraph are categorically inadmissible in Texas; impeachment by that means is barred and highly prejudicial | Appellate court: questions about taking a polygraph are inadmissible; trial court abused discretion in admitting such evidence and reversal was warranted |
| Whether a defendant "opened the door" to polygraph questioning by testifying he "did everything they asked" | State: Odom’s volunteered statement opened the door; the State could fairly rebut with evidence he did not submit to a polygraph | Odom: Even if he made an imprecise statement, rebuttal via polygraph questioning is improper because the topic is per se inadmissible | Held: Court of Appeals found ample other evidence of cooperation/uncooperativeness and that admitting polygraph questioning was unnecessary and prejudicial |
| Whether any mention of a polygraph is error per se (even where no polygraph occurred) | State: Not per se error; mention can be used to correct false impressions and impeach perjury or dishonesty | Odom: Texas precedent treats both polygraph results and questioning about taking a polygraph as inadmissible for all purposes | Held: Court of Appeals relied on long‑standing Texas authority barring polygraph evidence and treated the admission as reversible error in this record |
| Reliance on federal authority (U.S. v. Allard) to admit polygraph evidence | State: Cites Allard (5th Cir.) to support limited admittance under federal rules | Odom: Federal rule analysis is inapposite; Texas evidentiary law controls and forbids polygraph evidence | Held: Court of Appeals applied Texas precedent, not Allard; federal decision does not change Texas rule against polygraph evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (reaffirming Texas rule excluding polygraph evidence)
- Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (polygraph evidence inadmissible)
- Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (discussing unreliability and inadmissibility of polygraphs)
- Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (early authority excluding polygraph results and related questioning)
- Nichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (foundation for treating polygraph evidence as improper)
- Peterson v. State, 247 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951) (historical exclusion of polygraph evidence)
- U.S. v. Allard, 464 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (federal decision allowing limited polygraph‑related impeachment under federal rules; distinguishable under Texas law)