Ochoa v. Superior Court
132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233
Cal. Ct. App.2011Background
- Glasgow was found suitable for parole by the Board, which later was reversed by the Governor based in part on confidential informant information.
- Glasgow challenged the Governor’s decision via a habeas petition naming the Warden as respondent.
- The superior court ordered the Warden to either disclose unredacted confidential information to Glasgow or oppose the petition without relying on it.
- The Warden sought mandamus relief; the court stayed proceedings, accepted sealed confidential records, and issued a Palma notice about potential writ relief.
- The court eventually ordered disclosure or nonreliance on the confidential information, and the court directed an in camera and sealed approach under Evidence Code §915 to determine what could be disclosed to Glasgow’s counsel.
- This Court granted the petition for a peremptory writ to reverse the order and require sealing of the confidential material and an in camera proceeding to disclose as much as possible without revealing informants’ identities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion ordering disclosure of confidential information | Glasgow argues for disclosing sufficient information to mount a defense | Warden argues the information is confidential and nondisclosure is necessary | Abuse found; court must seal and conduct in camera disclosure limited to non-identifying data |
| Whether Prewitt and related case law justify nondisclosure given informant confidentiality | Prewitt case-by-case approach supports disclosure to Glasgow | Confidentiality overrides due process concerns when informs risk harm | Prewitt controls; informant confidentiality may limit disclosure and require balance |
| Whether an in camera proceeding under Evidence Code §915(b) is appropriate to determine disclosure | In camera review should be used to balance interests | Sealing is necessary to protect informants and security | Approved; §915(b) in camera process appropriate to determine permissible disclosure |
| Whether due process requires disclosure of confidential information in parole eligibility review | Due process requires meaningful opportunity to challenge allegations | Confidentiality may prevent full disclosure yet protect safety | Not absolute; case-by-case balancing under Prewitt governs, with limited disclosure |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Olson, 37 Cal.App.3d 783 (Cal. App. 1974) (confidentiality interest in official information doctrine)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. Supreme Court 1972) (due process for parole revocation; general framework for parole proceedings)
- In re Prewitt, 8 Cal.3d 470 (Cal. 1972) (case-by-case standard for due process in parole/term-fixing; nondisclosure can be justified to protect informants)
- In re Muszalski, 52 Cal.App.3d 475 (Cal. App. 1975) (expands approach to confidentiality and judicial balancing)
- In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258 (Cal. 1974) (case distinguishing parole release from revocation for due process requirements)
- Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 (Cal. App. 1989) (availability of writ relief when trial court ruling may be reviewed on appeal)