Ochoa v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services
430 Md. 315
| Md. | 2013Background
- Ochoa was convicted in 1998 of child abuse and third-degree sexual offense and required to register for 10 years under former Article 27 §792(i).
- 1999 revisions created lifetime registration for certain offenders and retroactively applied to child sexual offenders like Ochoa who were subject to 10-year registration and committed offenses before the revision’s effective date.
- 2002 codifications recodified the offenses (35C to CL §3-602; 464B to CL §3-307) and updated cross-references in CP §11-707.
- 2002 cross-reference changes and definitions expanded to include “sexually violent offense” and retroactivity provisions by CP §11-702.1(a) to govern who is subject to the new regime.
- 2010 CP §11-707(a)(4)(iii) imposes lifetime registration for Tier III offenders; retroactivity hinges on whether Ochoa was subject to registration on Sept. 30, 2010.
- Court holds that Ochoa’s 1998 convictions render him a Tier III offender and subject to lifetime registration under CP §11-707(a)(4)(iii) via retroactive application.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactive application of CP §11-707(a)(4)(iii) to Ochoa | Ochoa contends he fulfilled ten-year registration and should not face life registration. | Department argues statute applies retroactively to those subject to registration as of Sept. 30, 2010. | Retroactive and lifetime registration proper. |
| Whether Ochoa’s 1998 convictions make him a Tier III offender | Convictions under former Article 27 map to Tier III under CP §11-701(q)(1)-(2). | Recodified offenses are Tier III by statute. | Yes, Ochoa is a Tier III offender under CP §11-701(q)(1)-(2). |
| Penal character and retroactivity considerations | Registration may be punitive; retroactivity requires due process safeguards. | Not fully developed; retroactivity analysis governs. | Not addressed on the merits; retroactivity stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCloud v. Department of State Police, 426 Md. 473 (2012) (ascertain legislative intent; statutory interpretation)
- Smack v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298 (2003) (words of statute control; avoid absurd results)
- Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1 (2011) (rule of lenity; interpret ambiguities in favor of defendant)
- Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142 (1992) (ex post facto considerations; notice and prospective application)