22 Cal. App. 5th 235
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Deputy Arthur Ochoa was accused in March 2013 of harassment and related misconduct by a civilian (Priscilla); Sergeant Bittle received an interoffice memo and began fact‑finding on March 25, 2013.
- Bittle, a sergeant, attempted to contact the complainant and forwarded memoranda up the chain; he testified he could conduct fact‑finding and impose limited discipline (e.g., written reprimand) but could not authorize internal affairs.
- Chief Deputy Zimmerman formally authorized an internal affairs investigation on May 6, 2013; Senior Deputy Levig was assigned to the administrative investigation and served a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action (termination) on August 11, 2014.
- Two criminal investigations were undertaken: SR13‑10251 (criminal investigation beginning April 9, 2013, later reviewed by the District Attorney and an investigator) and SR14‑16963 (investigating alleged Penal Code §502 offense in mid‑2014). The first criminal probe did not result in prosecution.
- Ochoa filed a writ petition under POBRA (Gov. Code §3300 et seq.) claiming the administrative action was time‑barred under the one‑year rule in §3304(d)(1). The trial court found (1) the one‑year clock began March 25, 2013; but (2) the SR13‑10251 criminal investigation tolled the limitations period so petition failed. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the POBRA one‑year limitations period begin under §3304(d)(1)? | Ochoa: it began when Sergeant Bittle began investigating (March 25, 2013), so notification Aug 11, 2014 was late. | County: the clock begins only when an internal affairs investigation is authorized (May 6, 2013). | The court held the one‑year period begins when a "person authorized to initiate an investigation" discovers the allegation; a sergeant's fact‑finding can start the clock, so it began March 25, 2013. |
| Did pending criminal investigations toll the one‑year period? | Ochoa: the administrative deadline was not met because tolling did not cover the full relevant interval. | County: the criminal investigations (SR13‑10251 and SR14‑16963) tolled the one‑year period, making the disciplinary notice timely. | The court agreed the SR13‑10251 criminal investigation tolled the limitations period for at least part of the time, and overall affirmed the judgment (tolling made the action timely). |
Key Cases Cited
- Mays v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal.4th 313 (POBRA requires investigation completion and notice within one year of discovery by authorized person)
- Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco, 146 Cal.App.4th 1064 (criminal investigation tolls the one‑year POBRA period)
- Jackson v. City of Los Angeles, 111 Cal.App.4th 899 (POBRA balances agency interests and officer procedural protections)
- Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 89 Cal.App.4th 985 (punitive action may be imminent even if not yet imposed)
- Paterson v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal.App.4th 1393 (preliminary reports or inquiries may lead to punitive consequences)
- Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority, 61 Cal.4th 1378 (statutory application reviewed de novo)
