OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas
867 F.3d 604
5th Cir.2017Background
- OCA sued Texas alleging Tex. Elec. Code § 61.033 (requiring interpreters to be registered voters in the voter’s county) conflicts with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. § 10508), which allows a voter who "requires assistance ... by reason of ... inability to read or write" to be assisted by a person of the voter’s choice (subject only to employer/union limits).
- Facts: Mallika Das, an English-limited voter, was denied her son as an interpreter at a Williamson County polling place because he was not registered to vote in that county; Das could not complete her ballot and later died during the litigation.
- OCA claims the county restriction forces it to spend extra time and resources educating limited-English voters and thus has organizational standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 208.
- The district court granted summary judgment for OCA, declared § 61.033 invalid under Section 208, and enjoined Texas; Texas appealed challenging standing, sovereign immunity, the merits, and the scope of the injunction.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed that OCA has organizational standing, held § 61.033 conflicts with Section 208 because "to vote" includes all actions necessary to make a vote effective, and vacated the district court’s overly broad injunction, remanding for a narrower order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organizational standing | OCA: diversion of resources to educate limited-English voters (time, outreach changes) is a concrete injury | Texas: OCA’s costs are routine/pre-litigation and insufficient under City of Kyle | Held: OCA has organizational standing; diversion was non-litigation, concrete, and "perceptibly impaired" its mission |
| Traceability / Redressability | OCA: state statute causes the harm; relief against state will redress it | Texas: county officials misapplied law, so injury not traceable to state defendants | Held: injury is fairly traceable and redressable against the State and Secretary of State (chief election officer) |
| Sovereign immunity / Ex parte Young | OCA: VRA abrogates immunity (Congress’s enforcement power) and equitable relief is sought | Texas: Ex parte Young not satisfied because named official lacks enforcement connection | Held: Sovereign immunity not a bar; VRA validly abrogates immunity and Ex parte Young not needed for this relief |
| Scope of Section 208 ("to vote") and conflict with § 61.033 | OCA: "to vote" includes all actions necessary to make a vote effective (pre- and post-ballot); restriction on interpreters narrows Section 208 | Texas: Section 208 covers only in-ballot assistance; assistor provisions suffice; interpreter rules are supplemental | Held: "To vote" is defined broadly (statutorily) to include registration, casting, counting; § 61.033 impermissibly narrows Section 208 and is invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing framework)
- NAACP v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2010) (organizational standing—distinguishing litigation-related/preexisting activities)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (organizational injury where defendant’s practices "perceptibly impaired" mission)
- Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (limits on redressability/traceability where named officials lack enforcement connection)
- Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (VRA context referenced in legislative history discussion)
- John Doe #1 v. Veneman, 380 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2004) (injunction scope principles)
- Scott v. Schedler, 826 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2016) (district court injunctions must not exceed the legal basis of the lawsuit)
- Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (state official capacity enforcement discussion)