Obeya v. Sessions
884 F.3d 442
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- Clement Obeya, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in 2008 to New York petit larceny (N.Y. Penal Law § 155.25); sentence included probation and later jail for probation violation.
- DHS charged removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) committed within five years of admission.
- The IJ and BIA initially found Obeya removable; this Court (Obeya I) remanded because BIA precedent required intent to permanently deprive for larceny to be a CIMT.
- On remand the BIA (citing Diaz-Lizarraga, a same-day decision) adopted a broader rule: theft is a CIMT if intended to permanently deprive or to substantially erode the owner’s property rights, and applied that rule to Obeya (Obeya II).
- Obeya challenged retroactive application of Diaz-Lizarraga; the Second Circuit held the BIA erred by applying the new rule retroactively and also found New York petit larceny does not categorically require intent to permanently deprive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA could retroactively apply Diaz-Lizarraga’s expanded theft/CIMT rule | Obeya: retroactive application of a new BIA rule was improper; he reasonably relied on longstanding precedent requiring intent to permanently deprive | Government: Diaz-Lizarraga merely updated BIA standard to reflect modern theft definitions and did not depart from precedent | Court: BIA retroactively applied a new rule in error; retroactivity factors (Lugo) favor Obeya |
| Whether New York petit larceny is categorically a CIMT under the pre-Diaz rule (intent to permanently deprive) | Obeya: §155.25 does not require permanent deprivation; thus not categorically a CIMT under old test | Government: state law and appellate interpretation can satisfy CIMT standard | Court: §155.25 (and NY definitions) permit less-than-permanent takings; petit larceny is not categorically a CIMT under the old rule |
| Whether reliance on prior immigration rules is presumed for plea-taking defendants | Obeya: reasonable to rely on decades of BIA precedent when pleading guilty | Government: did not seriously contest reliance given its position that no departure occurred | Court: reasonable reliance presumed; reliance factor weighs for retroactivity relief |
| Whether BIA’s interest in uniformity outweighs reliance and hardship of removal | Government: strong interest in uniformity of immigration law | Obeya: deportation is a massive burden; uniformity does not outweigh reliance and fairness | Court: government interest insufficient to overcome reliance and severe burden of removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (interpreting BIA precedent to require intent to permanently deprive for larceny to be a CIMT)
- SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (agency rulemaking by adjudication and limits on retroactive application)
- Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2015) (factors for assessing retroactive application of agency rules)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (importance of immigration consequences to guilty pleas)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (constitutional obligation to advise noncitizen defendants of deportation risks)
- Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) (limits on retroactive immigration consequences)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach to comparing state offenses to immigration predicates)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits on using conviction records and the modified categorical approach)