O'Toole v. The Chicago Zoological Society
2015 IL 118254
| Ill. | 2015Background
- In 2010 Kristine O’Toole tripped on a paved path at Brookfield Zoo and was injured; she sued the Chicago Zoological Society (the Society) in 2012 for negligence.
- The Society moved to dismiss under section 2-619, arguing the Tort Immunity Act’s one-year limitations period (applicable to “local public entities”) barred the suit because the Society is a "local public entity" under 745 ILCS 10/1-206.
- The Society relied on a long-standing 1986 agreement with the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (the District) under which the District provided land and some tax funding and the Society agreed to "operate and maintain" the zoo, appoint and pay staff, procure insurance, submit budgets/audits, and allow District oversight rights.
- O’Toole argued the Society is not a local public entity because it is privately run: less than half its funding is from taxes, most trustees are private citizens, employees are not public employees, and the Society complies with OSHA.
- The trial court dismissed as time-barred; the appellate court reversed, finding the Society not tightly enmeshed with the District and thus not conducting "public business." The Illinois Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Chicago Zoological Society is a "local public entity" under the Tort Immunity Act, making the Act's one-year limitations period applicable | O’Toole: Society is private and not conducting "public business" — lacks governmental control, relies on private funds, employees and governance are private, subject to OSHA | Society: Agreement and statutory framework show it conducts public business for the District (zoo on District land funded in part by tax, District oversight rights), so it is a local public entity | Court: Society is not a local public entity because the District does not exercise operational control; the Society retains day-to-day management and autonomy, so the Act’s one-year limit does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16 (definitive interpretation of "public business" — focus on governmental control)
- Brugger v. Joseph Academy, Inc., 202 Ill. 2d 435 (reaffirmed Carroll: not-for-profit must be "tightly enmeshed" with government for immunity)
- Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, 238 Ill. 2d 262 (discussed scope of "local public entity" and related analysis)
- Brock v. Chicago Zoological Society, 820 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.) (OSHA/political-subdivision analysis showing District designed Society as private and lacking managerial control)