593 F.Supp.3d 838
C.D. Ill.2022Background:
- In April 2018 Grace O’Shea was sexually assaulted at an off‑campus bar by Conor Larkin; his sister Erin intervened and struck O’Shea. O’Shea reported the assault to police and to Augustana’s Title IX office.
- Conor was a prospective/recruited student at the time and later attended Augustana; O’Shea alleges the college nonetheless allowed Conor on campus and did not provide meaningful interim protections.
- O’Shea filed a formal Title IX complaint in January 2020. Augustana investigators (Phillis and Ross) allegedly conducted a shaming, improperly probing investigation (victim‑blaming questions, disclosure of confidential info, public calendar listing, and investigator missteps); reconciliation was pushed as an alternative.
- A scheduled hearing was canceled on jurisdictional grounds because Conor was not a student at the time of the assault; O’Shea’s appeal was denied. O’Shea alleges retaliation and deprivation of educational opportunities from Augustana’s post‑report conduct.
- Procedural posture: O’Shea sued (Nov. 2020) asserting Title IX claims against Augustana, IGVA claims against Conor and Erin, and state claims under Illinois’ Preventing Sexual Violence in Higher Education Act against college employees. Defendants moved to dismiss.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Augustana can be liable under Title IX for deliberate indifference to sexual harassment by non‑students arising off campus | O’Shea alleged the assaults deprived her of educational opportunities and Augustana was deliberately indifferent | Augustana: Davis requires substantial control over harasser/context; assault was off campus by a non‑student, so no deliberate indifference liability | Dismissed: plaintiff cannot state deliberate indifference claim as to Larkins because assault was off campus by a non‑student and college lacked control |
| Whether Count I plausibly alleges Title IX direct discrimination by Augustana (school’s own conduct) | O’Shea claims Augustana’s post‑report actions (investigation style, reconciliation pressure, disclosure) discriminated against her because of sex | Augustana: Complaint framed as deliberate indifference to Larkins; recharacterization is unfair notice; allegations do not show discrimination on basis of sex | Dismissed for pleading failure but court grants leave to replead a direct discrimination claim with greater specificity |
| Whether Augustana’s conduct states a Title IX retaliation claim | O’Shea alleges materially adverse investigatory tactics (demeaning questions, intimidation of witnesses, disclosure) taken in retaliation for reporting assault | Augustana argues plaintiff failed to allege an actionable adverse action and retaliatory motive | Denied: retaliation claim survives; plaintiff plausibly alleged materially adverse actions and retaliatory motive |
| Whether Illinois’ Preventing Sexual Violence in Higher Education Act implies a private right of action | O’Shea asks court to imply a private right and allow state‑law claims under the statute | Defendants argue (and court should) decline to imply a novel state cause of action in federal court | Dismissed without prejudice: court declines to decide novel state law implication and dismisses those counts so state courts can address first |
| Whether federal court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over IGVA claims against the Larkins | O’Shea relies on common facts (the assault) as related to federal claims | Defendants: the IGVA claims involve different operative facts and evidence and would predominate | Dismissed without prejudice: court finds no common nucleus of operative facts between the federal Title IX claim (college’s post‑report conduct) and the state assault claims (night‑of conduct) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (established the plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations)
- Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2012) (complaint must give fair notice of claim and basis)
- Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX deliberate‑indifference liability limited to institutions that have substantial control over harasser and context)
- Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019) (framework for Title IX deliberate indifference, direct discrimination, and retaliation claims)
- Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (Title IX direct discrimination analysis; showing discrimination on basis of sex must be plausible)
- Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017) (definition of materially adverse action for Title IX retaliation)
- Doe‑2 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2010) (no school liability where harassment occurred after employment/without institutional control)
- Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Orland Fire Prot. Dist., 929 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2019) (articulating Illinois test for implying a private cause of action)