O'Risky v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 1:17-cv-01046

Linda O’Risky was Director of Global Product Compliance at Mead Johnson Nutrition (MJN), based primarily in Evansville, Indiana; her role involved internal audits and reporting quality/food-safety concerns.
In 2015 she identified sealing defects and potential contamination risks in MJN’s eight‑ounce ready‑to‑use infant formula and repeatedly raised concerns internally and via MJN’s Integrity Concern hotline.
MJN conducted an internal compliance investigation; after the investigation, O’Risky’s coworkers identified her as the source, and she experienced workplace retaliation and marginalization.
MJN limited distribution of the implicated product in October 2015; in November 2015 MJN terminated O’Risky citing a corporate cost‑cutting initiative (Fuel for Growth). She was escorted out and her computer seized.
O’Risky sued alleging retaliation under the FSMA, Sarbanes‑Oxley, the Dodd‑Frank Act (DFA), and Illinois common law. MJN moved to dismiss the DFA and Illinois common‑law claims. The court resolved choice‑of‑law and common‑law issues and deferred the DFA issue pending Supreme Court review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which state law governs the common‑law retaliatory discharge claim?	O’Risky implicitly relies on Illinois law recognizing whistleblowing as a basis for retaliatory discharge.	MJN argues Indiana law governs because injury and employment centered in Indiana.	Court applied Illinois choice‑of‑law rules and held Indiana law governs.
Whether Indiana law allows a common‑law retaliatory discharge claim for whistleblowing	O’Risky contends whistleblowing supports a common‑law retaliatory discharge claim.	MJN contends Indiana does not recognize a whistleblower exception to at‑will employment.	Court held Indiana law does not recognize whistleblowing as a basis for common‑law retaliatory discharge and dismissed the claim with prejudice.
Whether the DFA’s anti‑retaliation protection covers internal reporting (not to the SEC)	O’Risky urges the Court to follow circuits that protect internal whistleblowers under DFA.	MJN urges a narrow textual reading: DFA protects only whistleblowers who report to the SEC.	Court deferred ruling on DFA claim pending Supreme Court decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.
Disposition of MJN’s motion to dismiss	N/A	N/A	Court granted in part (dismissed common‑law claim with prejudice) and denied in part (DFA dismissal denied without prejudice to renew after Somers).

Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir.) (standards for pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) review)
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610 (7th Cir.) (accept well‑pleaded facts and draw inferences for Rule 12(b)(6))
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (facial plausibility standard)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Esser v. McIntyre, 661 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 1996) (Illinois applies most‑significant‑relationship test in retaliatory discharge choice‑of‑law)
Nieman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 897 (C.D. Ill.) (choice‑of‑law application for employment claims)
French v. Beatrice Foods Co., 854 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.) (applying law of place of termination where employment centered there)
Bregin v. Liquidebt Sys., Inc., 548 F.3d 533 (7th Cir.) (Indiana does not recognize whistleblower exception to at‑will employment)
Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183 (Ill.) (Illinois recognizes whistleblowing as possible basis for retaliatory discharge)
Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.) (holding DFA protects internal whistleblowers; Supreme Court granted certiorari)