O'Grady v. State.
SCAP-14-0001363
| Haw. | Sep 27, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Michael and Leiloni O’Grady appealed a circuit court judgment adverse to them in a State Tort Liability Act suit against the State and DOT; this court vacated and remanded for further proceedings on causation and discretionary-function issues.
- After remand, the O’Gradys sought appellate attorney’s fees ($15,842.14) under HRS §§ 662-9 and 662-12 and costs ($4,815.17) under HRAP Rule 39 and HRS § 662-9.
- HRS § 662-9 permits courts to allow “court costs and fees as set by law” to the prevailing party in State Tort Liability Act actions; HRS § 662-12 controls attorney’s-fee awards to plaintiffs and caps them at 25% of amounts recovered, payable out of the judgment (with a sanctions exception).
- The Supreme Court analyzed statutory text, legislative history (1979 amendment reversing Levy), and precedent to determine whether appellate fee and cost awards were authorized and ripe.
- The Court held the fee request premature because there is no final “judgment for” plaintiffs under HRS § 662-12 (vacatur/remand does not order damages); but it awarded appellate costs ($4,815.17) because HRS § 662-9 authorizes costs against the State and HRAP Rule 39 governs their computation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may recover attorney’s fees under HRS §§ 662-9 and 662-12 after this Court vacated and remanded | O’Grady: court may award full attorney’s fees under § 662-9 as prevailing parties; alternatively fees as sanctions under § 662-12 | State: § 662-12 requires a judgment in favor of plaintiffs; no such judgment exists, so fee award is premature; State was not the appealing party so sanctions inappropriate | Denied as premature. HRS § 662-9’s fee-shifting is bounded by § 662-12; a fee award under § 662-12 requires a judgment for the plaintiff (vacatur/remand is insufficient) |
| Whether HRS § 662-9 "authorizes by law" awarding appellate costs against the State permitting HRAP Rule 39 to apply | O’Grady: HRS § 662-9 authorizes costs and HRAP Rule 39 allows taxation of appellate costs after vacatur | State: § 662-9 only says costs are “as set by law” and does not independently authorize costs against the State absent another law | Held: HRS § 662-9 constitutes a clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity for court costs in chapter 662 suits and thus authorizes costs; HRAP Rule 39 governs computation and procedure |
| Whether O’Gradys are the "prevailing party" for purposes of costs under HRS § 662-9 | O’Grady: vacatur of circuit court judgment on main issues (causation, discretionary function) makes them prevailing parties on appeal | State: disputed; but did not lodge specific objections to cost items | Held: O’Gradys were prevailing parties on appeal; costs are awardable |
| Amount and supportability of appellate costs under HRAP Rule 39 | O’Grady: requested $4,815.17 with invoices for transcripts, filing fee, and copying | State: asked court to deny if HRAP 39(a) applied but otherwise raised no specific objections; court to review sufficiency | Held: Awarded full requested appellate costs ($4,815.17); entries were supported and unopposed |
Key Cases Cited
- Boyd v. Hawaii State Ethics Comm’n, 138 Hawai‘i 218 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Levy v. Kimball, 51 Haw. 540 (interpretation of HRS § 662-12 pre-1979)
- Nelson v. University of Hawai‘i, 99 Hawai‘i 262 ("judgment awarded to plaintiff" requirement for appellate fee awards)
- Educators Ventures, Inc. v. Bundy, 3 Haw. App. 435 ("as set by law" language applied to costs and fees)
- Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. v. Akahane, 44 Haw. 93 (definition of final judgment)
- State v. Alangcas, 134 Hawai‘i 515 (construing laws in pari materia)