641 B.R. 120
Bankr. S.D. Tex.2022Background
- In 2013 Burg and attorney Michael O’Connor signed a contingent-fee agreement: 30% of any recovery pre-appeal and 35% if there was an appeal, covering reductions in her mortgage indebtedness.
- O’Connor litigated and obtained a 2014 final judgment (affirmed on appeal in 2016) that cancelled Burg’s mortgage debt; under the fee pact he was entitled to 35% of the reduction—calculated as $170,591.02.
- Burg filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in January 2019; O’Connor (later his executor, Sandra O’Connor) sued to except the $170,591.02 fee from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
- At trial the court found Burg not credible and found evidence she cut off communication and took a reverse mortgage shortly after the mandate issued, using funds for home improvements and personal expenses rather than paying O’Connor.
- The Court held Burg made a knowing, fraudulent misrepresentation of intent to pay, relied upon by O’Connor, and therefore the $170,591.02 debt is nondischargeable; it awarded the plaintiff $56,617.75 in attorney’s fees, $518.48 in expenses, plus post-judgment interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence & amount of debt under fee agreement | Fee agreement signed; judgment canceled debt; 35% of reduction = $170,591.02 | Debt disputed on schedules | Court found fee agreement enforceable and amount proven by preponderance; $170,591.02 owed |
| Statute of frauds re: alleged oral promise to sell home | Oral promise irrelevant to the clear written fee term for 35% recovery | Oral promise to sell home unenforceable under Texas statute of frauds | Statute of frauds did not void the remainder of the written fee agreement; defense rejected |
| Nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) (false pretenses/representations) | Burg promised to pay contingent fee but intended not to; O’Connor relied and provided services | Burg denies intent to defraud; argues no misrepresentation of current/past fact | Court found Burg knowingly misrepresented intent to perform, described present fact, O’Connor relied—debt nondischargeable |
| Attorney’s fees, costs, and interest | Prevailing party entitled to reasonable fees and expenses; sought $56,617.75 fees + $518.48 costs | Burg did not controvert reasonableness/necessity | Fees and costs awarded as reasonable; post-judgment interest granted at prevailing rate |
Key Cases Cited
- Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (constitutional limits on bankruptcy courts’ final adjudicatory power)
- Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (party consent can cure adjudicatory-authority defects)
- Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (distinction and scope of § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud theories)
- Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (preponderance standard in nondischargeability proceedings)
- Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781 (intent not to perform at time of promise can constitute false representation)
- Bank of La. v. Bercier, 934 F.2d 689 (Fifth Circuit discussion of false-representation element under § 523(a)(2)(A))
- Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542 (post-judgment interest on attorney’s fees)
- Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (nondischargeability of certain debts includes related relief such as fees)
