O'Bryan v. McDonald
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21890
Fed. Cir.2014Background
- Marcus W. O’Bryan served in the Marines (1973–1976); discharge records showed 20/20 vision and no noted eye condition at entry.
- Within one year of discharge he became legally blind from Leber’s hereditary optic atrophy; he filed for service connection in 1977.
- VA regional office denied benefits (1979) and the Board affirmed (1980), concluding Leber’s is a congenital/developmental "defect," not a "disease," relying on 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c).
- O’Bryan argued his symptoms began in service, Leber’s is a "disease," and he is entitled to the presumption of soundness under 38 U.S.C. § 1111; the Board rejected a clear-and-unmistakable-error (CUE) reopening in 2010 and the Veterans Court affirmed.
- The Federal Circuit reviewed only legal issues and held the Veterans Court misapplied the proper legal standard for what qualifies as a "congenital or developmental defect."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a progressive hereditary eye condition (Leber’s) is a "congenital or developmental defect" excluded from § 1110 compensation | O’Bryan: Leber’s is a "disease," progressive and thus compensable; presumption of soundness applies because condition not noted on entry | Government/Board: Leber’s is a congenital/developmental "defect" excluded by § 3.303(c), so no presumption of soundness | The regulation’s phrase is ambiguous; under VA General Counsel guidance, congenital/developmental "defects" are static (non‑progressive); progressive hereditary conditions like Leber’s are diseases, so the Veterans Court misapplied the standard and the case is vacated and remanded |
| Proper deference to VA General Counsel interpretations of § 3.303(c) | O’Bryan: GC interpretations support classifying progressive hereditary diseases as "diseases" not "defects" | Government: GC interpretation could allow compensation for untreatable hereditary conditions; argues against broad application | Court: Affords deference to the VA General Counsel interpretations (Auer/Thun framework) and finds them reasonable in distinguishing static defects from progressive diseases |
| Effect of classifying a condition as a disease on presumption of soundness and burden of proof | O’Bryan: If Leber’s is a disease, presumption of soundness applies and government must rebut preexistence and non‑aggravation | Government: Classifying Leber’s as defect removes presumption; alternatively may contest aggravation | Held: If treated as a disease, veteran gets presumption of soundness; government can rebut by showing heredity (preexistence) and no service aggravation (e.g., natural progression) |
| Whether pace/pattern of progression alters legal classification under § 3.303(c) | O’Bryan: Progression makes condition a disease regardless of speed | Government: Pattern/speed might distinguish Leber’s from other hereditary diseases like retinitis pigmentosa | Held: Pattern/speed do not change the legal test—key question is capability to progress; Leber’s is capable of progression and thus a disease |
Key Cases Cited
- Morris v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.) (upholding § 3.303(c) exclusions and discussing scope of compensable conditions)
- Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir.) (VA authority to define "disease" under § 1110 and validity of § 3.303(c))
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (agency interpretation of its own regulation entitled to deference)
- Thun v. Shinseki, 572 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.) (applying Auer deference to VA interpretations)
- Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir.) (presumption of soundness and government’s burden to rebut preexistence and aggravation)