Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert
139 S. Ct. 710
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Lambert sued Nutraceutical in 2013 alleging consumer‑protection violations and obtained initial class certification.
- On February 20, 2015 the district court decertified the class. Rule 23(f) ordinarily requires a petition for permission to appeal to the court of appeals within 14 days of such an order.
- Lambert told the district court at a March 2 status conference he intended to file a motion for reconsideration and was told to file it by March 12; he filed the motion on March 12 (20 days after decertification).
- The district court denied reconsideration on June 24, and Lambert filed a Rule 23(f) petition in the Ninth Circuit on July 8 (14 days after denial, but well beyond 14 days after the original decertification order).
- The Ninth Circuit deemed Lambert’s petition timely by applying equitable tolling and reversed on the merits; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Rule 23(f)’s deadline is subject to equitable tolling.
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held Rule 23(f) is nonjurisdictional but not subject to equitable tolling because the Federal Rules (esp. Appellate Rules 2 and 26(b)) and precedent foreclose tolling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lambert) | Defendant's Argument (Nutraceutical) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 23(f)’s 14‑day filing deadline may be equitably tolled | Rule 23(f) is nonjurisdictional so courts may excuse late filings for equitable reasons; Lambert acted diligently | The Rules and precedent prohibit tolling of the 23(f) petition deadline; strict enforcement required | No — Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling |
| Whether Appellate Rule 26(b)’s carveout permits courts to "permit" late filings even if they cannot "extend" time | The prohibition on "extending" time should not bar courts from "permitting" late filings after the fact | Robinson and related precedent treat permitting a late filing as effectively enlarging the filing period and therefore forbidden | Appellate Rule 26(b) forbids accepting late petitions of this type; Robinson controls |
| Whether Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f) authorize timeliness discretion | Notes showing wide appellate discretion support flexible treatment of petitions | Notes concern interlocutory review standards, not timeliness; text controls | Committee notes do not authorize tolling; text of Rules governs |
| Whether a timely motion for reconsideration filed within 14 days tolls the 23(f) deadline | A motion for reconsideration should make time run from resolution of that motion | Timely reconsideration changes when the 14‑day period begins (it affects finality), not by tolling; untimely reconsideration does not toll | Timely reconsideration affects when the 14‑day window starts, but tolling is unavailable; Court of Appeals may reconsider other preserved timeliness arguments on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (textual rule showing intent to foreclose tolling controls availability of equitable exceptions)
- United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (rule forbidding enlargement of filing period prohibits courts from accepting late appeals as a matter of equity)
- Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claim‑processing rules and limits on waiver/forfeiture)
- United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1 (1991) (timely postjudgment motions affect finality and the start of appeal periods rather than constituting tolling)
- Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (interlocutory appeal is an exception to final‑judgment rule and requires careful calibration)
- Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (courts may not disregard plain import of properly raised procedural rules)
- Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (discussion of appeal time limits and jurisdictional language)