320 Conn. 519
Conn.2016Background
- NPC Offices, LLC owns 192 South Main St.; prior agreement (1960) granted an express easement across a driveway on adjoining property (184–188 South Main St.) for "residential or professional offices," terminating the easement if 192 was used for purposes other than those.
- Defendants own 184–188 and erected a fence restricting access; plaintiff brought suit seeking quiet title, injunctive relief, and enforcement of the easement; defendants counterclaimed that the easement terminated because 192 had been used for non‑"professional offices."
- Trial court found an express easement existed but concluded it terminated because tenants included a mortgage brokerage, a home health‑care agency, and an appliance delivery coordination service (not "professional offices").
- The Appellate Court affirmed, adopting a narrow definition of "professional" (persons belonging to a learned profession or requiring high training/proficiency) and thus agreeing those tenants terminated the easement.
- The Supreme Court granted certification, held the term "professional offices" ambiguous because dictionaries support broader meanings, construed ambiguities in favor of the easement grantee, reversed the Appellate Court, and remanded for a new trial with instructions on issues the trial court must address.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "professional offices" in the 1960 easement | Broad ordinary meaning — includes offices engaged in a pursuit for gain or livelihood (e.g., mortgage broker, home health‑care agency, delivery coordinator) | Narrow legal definition — limited to learned professions requiring high training/proficiency | Term is ambiguous; apply broader ordinary meaning in favor of grantee; Appellate Court erred in adopting narrow definition |
| Whether ambiguity should be construed against drafter | Plaintiff urged construing ambiguity for grantee of easement | Defendants suggested drafter rule might apply | Court noted drafter rule but no finding who drafted instrument; did not apply it |
| Whether alternative grounds (judicial estoppel, induced error) support affirmance | Plaintiff: not applicable here | Defendants: urged alternative grounds in §84-11 statement | Court declined to consider because not raised/briefed in Appellate Court and would prejudice plaintiff |
| Whether rear‑lot activities (log cutting, boat storage) terminated easement | Plaintiff: not resolved; factual issues remain | Defendants: argued these uses independently terminated easement | Court declined to decide — factual findings required; remanded for trial on these issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Il Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven Land Co., 254 Conn. 502 (discusses deed construction and intent of parties)
- Lago v. Guerrette, 219 Conn. 262 (ambiguities in easement instruments construed in favor of grantee)
- Deane v. Kahn, 317 Conn. 157 (distinguishes legal questions of deed interpretation from factual determinations about easement scope)
- Murtha v. Hartford, 303 Conn. 1 (contract ambiguity standard)
- Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 (use of Black's and other dictionaries in ascertaining ordinary meaning)
- Harbour Pointe, LLC v. Harbour Landing Condominium Assn., Inc., 300 Conn. 254 (rule that ambiguity is construed against drafter)
- Lakeview Associates v. Woodlake Master Condominium Assn., Inc., 239 Conn. 769 (ordinary meaning controls absent special connotation)
- NPC Offices, LLC v. Kowaleski, 152 Conn. App. 445 (Appellate Court decision adopting narrow definition of "professional offices")
